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WIDENING BATSON’S NET TO ENSNARE MORE
THAN THE UNAPOLOGETICALLY BIGOTED OR
PAINFULLY UNIMAGINATIVE ATTORNEY
Jeffrey Bellin† & Junichi P. Semitsu††
In Snyder v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment
to rooting out racially discriminatory jury selection and its belief that the
three-step framework established in Batson v. Kentucky is capable of unearthing racially discriminatory peremptory strikes. Yet the Court left in
place the talismanic protection available to those who might misuse the peremptory challenge—the unbounded collection of justifications that courts,
including the Supreme Court, accept as “race neutral.”
To evaluate the Court’s continuing faith in Batson, we conducted a
survey of all federal published and unpublished judicial decisions issued in
this first decade of the new millennium (2000–2009) that reviewed state or
federal trial court rejections of a Batson challenge. In light of this study and
studies that have come before, we conclude that Batson is easily avoided
through the articulation of a purportedly race-neutral explanation for juror
strikes. As a result, there is no reason to believe that Batson is, as the Court
suggests, achieving its goal of eliminating race-based jury exclusion and little
hope that it will ever do so. In light of our conclusion, this Article proposes
an alteration to the Batson framework that we believe would enable trial
courts to reduce the role of race in the jury selection process.
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INTRODUCTION
The jury plays a vital role in the narrative of American criminal
justice, serving as an “inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor”1 and as the “criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.’”2
Indeed, the very first law that the Supreme Court branded racially discriminatory and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause was a West
Virginia statute restricting jury service to white men.3 Since then, juries have been at the forefront of the Court’s efforts to stamp out race
discrimination in criminal justice. The recent case of Snyder v. Louisiana4 continues this trend, reversing a death sentence after concluding
that a prosecutor’s proffered explanations for the peremptory strike
of a potential juror were a pretext for racial discrimination.
But despite its emphasis on the importance of a color-blind jury
selection process and a self-proclaimed record of “over a century of
jurisprudence dedicated to the elimination of race prejudice within
1

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880)).
3
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312; Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 421 (recognizing Strauder as “the first case invalidating a
state statute on equal protection grounds”).
4
552 U.S. 472, 485–86 (2008).
2
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the jury selection process,”5 the Court has allowed discrimination to
flourish by failing to place significant limits on race-based jury selection’s primary enabler—the peremptory challenge.6 While the Court
has consistently reaffirmed its 1986 holding in Batson v. Kentucky that
race-based peremptory strikes are unconstitutional,7 virtually every
commentator (and numerous judges) who have studied the issue have
concluded that race-based juror strikes continue to plague American
trials.8
Our own analysis of Batson in practice reveals that it is not trial
judges who are primarily at fault. Rather, the blame lies squarely with
the Batson framework itself. The current framework makes it exceedingly difficult for judges to reject even the most spurious of peremptory strikes—a reality that is not lost on trial attorneys. Specifically,
the Supreme Court has decreed that before a trial court can find a
Batson violation it must determine that an attorney has (1) exercised a
racially motivated peremptory challenge and (2) lied to the court in
an effort to justify the strike.9 The trial court must find all of this
based almost solely on the attorney’s demeanor. Accordingly, trial
courts rightly hesitate to make the damning findings Batson requires
5

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618 (1991).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (“[T]here can be no dispute[ ] that
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’” (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562
(1953))). A case decided during the final editing stages of this Article fits comfortably into
our thesis. See Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam) (reversing a Ninth
Circuit ruling that granted relief to a defendant claiming a Batson violation where the
prosecutor struck two black jurors and offered as “race-neutral” justifications that one of
the jurors said he was “frequently stopped by California police officers because . . . of his
race and age,” and the other “had a master’s degree in social work, and had interned at the
county jail”).
7
The Court also recently applied Batson in Thaler v. Haynes, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1172,
1174–75 (2010) (per curiam) where it concluded that the trial judge who rules on a Batson
challenge need not be the same judge that personally observed the prospective juror’s
demeanor.
8
See, e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (criticizing “Batson’s fundamental failings”); Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme
Court’s Utter Failure to Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 WIS. L. REV.
501, 501, 528 (decrying “Batson’s toothless bite” and opining that Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.
765 (1995) (per curiam) “marked the final demise of the Batson doctrine into the rule of
useless symbolism”); Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting
Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2008) (arguing that “Batson’s promise of protection
against racially discriminatory jury selection has not been realized”); Antony Page, Batson’s
Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 178, 179
(2005) (stating that “Batson has engendered an enormous amount of often virulent criticism” and contending that “[m]ost of the criticism of Batson is justifiable”); Michael J.
Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 236 (1993) (arguing that “in almost any situation a
prosecutor can readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation to justify striking black jurors because of their race”).
9
See infra Part II.
6
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on such paltry evidence. Add to this the fact that attorneys may not
even be aware of the racial motivation for their own strikes, as well as
the administrative difficulty of remedying Batson violations, and it
should come as no surprise that Batson, in application, is all form and
little substance.
This Article proposes a two-part fix to what ails Batson: (1)
decouple Batson violations from any finding regarding the striking attorney’s subjective intent and (2) foster a procedural mechanism that
permits the immediate reseating of an improperly stricken juror without the juror ever knowing that she was the subject of a strike. In
essence, we propose to minimize both the finding required to invalidate a peremptory challenge and the consequence of that finding, all
for a common goal: to empower courts to disallow dubious peremptory challenges even without concrete evidence that any particular
strike was racially motivated. As we shall explain, this reform adheres
to the basic principles underlying Batson, while also freeing judges to
make the findings that could breathe substantive life into the noble
constitutional command that race must not factor into jury selection.
The argument proceeds in four parts. In Part I we introduce the
troubling case of Commonwealth v. Cook to highlight the overarching
problem addressed by this Article—that given the inherent difficulty
of eliminating race-based jury selection, the Batson framework as currently applied is not equal to the task. Part II presents an overview of
the Batson framework, revealing the foundation for our reform proposal to follow. Part III summarizes the results of a survey we performed
of all federal court decisions from 2000 to 2009 that reviewed allegedly race-based peremptory strikes. In this Part, we confirm that Cook
is no aberration but is instead representative of a widespread problem.
Part IV reviews reforms that commentators have proposed to address
the widely recognized underenforcement of Batson. We argue that
these suggested reforms are either not politically viable or would actually exacerbate the problem. Finally, Part V details the reform proposal that we believe will significantly curtail race-based peremptory
strikes and widen Batson’s net.
I
“YOU’RE THERE TO WIN”: LESSONS
COMMONWEALTH V. COOK

FROM

It would be difficult to hypothesize a fictional case that could better demonstrate the failings of Batson than the 2008 Pennsylvania case
of Commonwealth v. Cook.10 The facts underlying the case began two
decades earlier, in 1987, when Assistant District Attorney Jack McMa10

952 A.2d 594 (Pa. 2008).
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hon prepared a training video for new prosecutors on how to select as
“unfair” a jury as possible.11 In the video, McMahon unabashedly advocated striking blacks and women from jury venires:
Let’s face it, . . . there’s the blacks from the low-income areas . . . you don’t want those people on your jury. . . . You know, in
selecting blacks, again, you don’t want the real educated ones, . . .
[and] this goes across the board, all races, you don’t want smart
people. [I]n my experience, black women, young black women, are
very bad. There’s an antagonism. I guess maybe because they’re
downtrodden on two respects, they got two minorities, they’re women and they’re blacks, so they’re downtrodden on two areas. And
they somehow want to take it out on somebody, and you don’t want
it to be you. And so younger black women are difficult, I’ve found.

Acknowledging that such race-based strikes ran afoul of Batson,
which the Supreme Court decided a year earlier, McMahon noted
ways to conceal race-based strikes:
When you do have a black juror, you question them at length. And
on this little sheet that you have, mark something down that you can
articulate later if something happens . . . and question them and
say, “Well the woman had a kid about the same age as the defendant
and I thought she’d be sympathetic to him,” or “She’s unemployed
and I just don’t like unemployed people.” . . . So, sometimes under
that line you may want to ask more questions of those people so it
gives you more ammunition to make an articulable reason as to why
you are striking them, not for race.

McMahon warned rookie prosecutors of the consequences of failing
to heed this advice:
If you go in there and any one of you think you’re going to be some
noble civil libertarian and try to get jurors, ‘well, he says that he can
be fair; I’ll go with him,’ that’s ridiculous. You’ll lose; you’ll be out
of the office; you’ll be doing corporate law. Because that’s what will
happen. You’re there to win.12
11
Videotape: Jury Selection with Jack McMahon (DATV Prods. 1987), available at
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-5102834972975877286. The Office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia released this video in April of 1997; the video was harshly
criticized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717,
729–31 (Pa. 2000).
12
Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, supra note 11. Some of the excerpts of these
comments are included in Basemore, 744 A.2d at 730–31, though the language differs
slightly in places. Neither McMahon nor his then-supervisor, District Attorney Ronald D.
Castille, has disputed the authenticity of the video. See Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 273
(3d Cir. 2008) (“The Commonwealth does not attempt to defend the contents of the McMahon video.”). Then–District Attorney Lynne Abraham released the video during an
election campaign. Cook, 952 A.2d at 611–12, 612 n.14. In press coverage following the
release, the incumbent Abraham explained that she felt “‘ethically, morally and legally’
compelled to release the information ‘on a former prosecutor who advocated selecting
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After receiving a copy of the video from the District Attorney’s
Office almost a decade after his trial, Robert Cook filed a postconviction petition for relief, arguing that when a jury convicted him of firstdegree murder in 1988, McMahon had practiced what he preached.13
During voir dire, McMahon had used fourteen of his nineteen peremptory challenges to strike black potential jurors from Cook’s jury.14
The resulting jury sentenced Cook to death.15
In 2002, a Philadelphia court held a hearing to review Cook’s
claim.16 After reviewing the fifteen-year-old voir dire transcript, McMahon provided specific explanations for striking eleven of the fourteen black prospective jurors but struggled to recall the specific
reasons for the remaining three. For example, in explaining one
strike, he testified:
Again I can’t—there’s nothing that jumps out at me as to a reason I
would have struck this individual other than again what I’ve talked
about a few other of the jurors. This is not a very long voir dire
either, very short voir dire and there’s nothing that I can—that refreshes my recollection as to [a] reason why I struck this individual.
It obviously was something outside the cold record, how she answered, how she dressed, how she appeared, how she answered
these questions is the only thing I can tell you.17

In addition, some of McMahon’s explanations were arguably contradicted by the existence of similarly situated jurors he did not strike.
For example, McMahon struck two black potential jurors because they
were unemployed and he was concerned about their “stability”; however, he did not strike a similarly unemployed white venireperson.18
Perhaps most notably, McMahon did not disavow his comments in the
video nor testify that he did not utilize the approach he summarized
therein.19 Nevertheless, the court rejected Cook’s Batson claim.20
Cook appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. That court affirmed, concluding that McMahon’s explanations rebutted Cook’s
jurors on the basis of race, seeking unfair panels and lying about the process.’” Id. at 611
(citations omitted).
13
See Cook, 952 A.2d at 601.
14
Id. at 605. The court also noted that “McMahon struck 58% (14) of the 24 black
venirepersons whom he had an opportunity to strike and 18% (5) of the white venirepersons he had an opportunity to strike.” Id.
15
Id. at 600.
16
Id. at 601.
17
Id. at 606.
18
Id. at 609. One of the unemployed—and allegedly unstable—black jurors was a
twenty-four-year-old student living with her mother. The dissent in Cook commented that
“[i]t is not evident, however, why a 24-year-old student may be considered in any respect
unusual or unstable.” Id. at 638 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
19
Id. at 637.
20
Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
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suggestion that any of the fourteen challenged strikes were racially
motivated.21
Admittedly, Cook is an unusual case because it involved direct evidence of a prosecutor’s race-conscious juror-selection strategy. Moreover, practices like those advocated in McMahon’s training video are
likely no longer officially sanctioned in prosecution offices.22 Nevertheless, Cook unequivocally highlights Batson’s impotence. Even in a
case in which the defendant produced a veritable cornucopia of evidence of racial motivation, Batson permitted the strikes to stand. Justice Marshall’s critique that Batson, as currently interpreted, permits
courts to deny defendants relief even in the face of “smoking guns”23
rings true in Cook.
While Cook illustrates the need for Batson reform, it also demonstrates the enormity of the task of eradicating race-based jury selection. The difficulty stems, in part, from the fact that an attorney’s
animus toward members of any race or an institutional racism that
pervades the legal community will not explain most race-based strikes.
Rather, the difficulty is a function of the continued relevance of race
in our larger society and the fact that, in an adversary system, the attorneys “are there to win.”
Racism is often defined as the irrational hatred of another race or
the belief that one’s own race is superior.24 But conscious or subconscious race-based peremptory strikes might constitute a rational form
of discrimination. Consider an Asian-American defense attorney representing a black defendant in a capital murder case with a white victim. Racism is unlikely to explain why she might disproportionately
21

Id. at 604–11.
For example, the video is not at all representative of the training one of the authors
of this Article received while serving as an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of
Columbia. Compare Jennifer Emily, Black Juror Seated: Judge Orders Change After All-White
Panel Picked in Murder Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 31, 2009, LexisNexis Academic (reporting that Dallas County District Attorney’s Office employee handbook now includes “a
section about race and jury selection” and that prosecutors in the office have been told
that “if a [Batson] challenge based on jury selection was upheld, there would be an internal
investigation”), with Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334–35 (2003) (highlighting that in
the 1960s and 1970s, evidence suggested that the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office
had a “formal policy to exclude minorities from jury service” that included a “1963 circular
by the District Attorney’s Office” instructing “prosecutors to exercise peremptory strikes
against minorities: [ ]‘Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any
minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well educated.’”).
23
Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
24
See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious
Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1106–07 (2009) (noting
that the most “rank form of racism” involves “either a desire to disparage a group or the
belief that the group is inherently inferior in some fundamental way,” while recognizing
that in other circumstances, race-based decision making can be motivated not by animus
but by potentially erroneous empirical assessments).
22
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exclude white jurors and fill the jury box with as many black jurors as
possible; the chances are slim that the attorney would be acting out of
a hatred of white jurors or a belief that black jurors represent a superior race.25 Rather, she may be aware of: (1) the documented tendency of jurors to be more sympathetic to the defendant when they
share similar characteristics,26 (2) studies confirming that white jurors
are more likely to convict and to more harshly sentence black defendants accused of killing white victims,27 or (3) studies demonstrating
25
We recognize that, unfortunately, most of the racial examples in this Article continue the black–white dichotomy that has dominated the discussion of race in the United
States. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 1709 n.140 (noting the weaknesses of the “black–white
binary” as an analytical paradigm); Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 8, at 235 n.38 (using
the original Batson paradigm to facilitate discussion). Most of the Batson cases in the last
decade, however, fall within this paradigm. Moreover, most psychological studies addressing race and juries—whether focused on the defendant’s race, the victim’s race, or the
juror’s race—have employed a black–white dichotomy. See Samuel R. Sommers, Race and
the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 175 (2007) (recognizing that “the vast majority of studies have compared [w]hite jurors’ judgments of
[w]hite and [b]lack defendants” and that “[t]his focus on the [w]hite/[b]lack dichotomy
mirrors the myopia found in the more general psychological literature on prejudice”).
Indeed, we found few psychological studies of jurors that went beyond this dichotomy. See
David A. Abwender & Kenyatta Hough, Interactive Effects of Characteristics of Defendant and
Mock Juror on U.S. Participants’ Judgment and Sentencing Recommendations, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL.
603, 603 (2001) (noting, among other things, that Latino mock jurors rendered harsher
decisions when the defendant was black rather than white); Jack P. Lipton, Racism in the
Jury Box: The Hispanic Defendant, 5 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 275, 282 (1983) (observing that white
mock jurors were more likely than Latino mock jurors to react negatively to a Latino defendant); Dolores A. Perez et al., Ethnicity of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions,
23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1249, 1249 (1993) (concluding that majority-white mock juries
were more likely than majority-Latino mock juries to convict a defendant, especially if the
defendant was Latino).
26
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611,
1639–40 (1985) (“It would appear that white subjects tend to assume less favorable characteristics about black defendants than white defendants and that such assumptions contribute to these subjects’ greater tendency to find black defendants guilty.”); Nancy J. King,
Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions,
92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 75–100 (1993) (reviewing jury discrimination studies and finding that
race of jurors generally effects outcomes).
27
See William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis
of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 189, 259 (2001) (concluding
that in 340 capital trials, the higher the proportion of white jurors, the more likely those
jurors would sentence a black defendant to death, especially when the victim was white);
Linda A. Foley & Minor H. Chamblin, The Effect of Race and Personality on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 112 J. PSYCHOL. 47, 48–49 (1982) (observing that white jurors were more likely to vote
to convict a defendant accused of sexual battery when the defendant was black than when
he was white but finding no statistical significance with black mock jurors); see also Thomas
W. Brewer, Race and Jurors’ Receptivity to Mitigation in Capital Cases: The Effect of Jurors’, Defendants’, and Victims’ Race in Combination, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 529, 542 (2004) (finding that
“[b]lacks and [w]hites actually seem to give mitigation the same level of attention in the
bulk of capital cases” but that “when [b]lack jurors are faced with a situation where an ingroup member, [b]lack defendant, is faced with killing an out-group member, [w]hite
victim, that they become significantly more receptive to mitigation than their [w]hite colleagues on the jury”); Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 43 (2001) (“The empirical evidence tends to show that white jurors are

R
R
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that white jurors in racially-diverse juries are more lenient toward a
black defendant than white jurors in all-white juries.28 In other words,
if this defense attorney seeks to maximize the chances of her client’s
acquittal, she cannot ignore the fact that race matters.
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s jury discrimination jurisprudence
has assumed that race matters ever since its 1880 decision in Strauder
v. West Virginia.29 The Court held that a statute barring black citizens
from the jury box was “a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing . . . equal justice.”30 The Court
concluded, however, that the discriminatory statute violated not the
black venireperson’s Equal Protection rights but the black defendant’s
rights. In granting this Equal Protection right to the defendant, the
Court presumed that jurors of different races in criminal prosecutions
would react differently depending on the race of the accused.31
Even as our society has become increasingly racially diverse and
our tolerance of discriminatory attitudes has subsided, we cannot realistically expect the salience of race-based jury selection to recede until
the societal relevance of race diminishes. Over half a century after
Brown v. Board of Education32 desegregated public schools and four decades after the passage of sweeping civil rights laws, racial disparities
remain in virtually every quality-of-life measure including health,33 in-

more likely than black jurors to convict black defendants.”). For a comprehensive review
of social-science research on race and juries, see generally Sommers, supra note 25, at 183,
arguing that “[r]esearch on race and legal decision making has provided compelling evidence that race can exert a causal effect on trial outcomes in some cases.”
28
See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597, 606 (2006) (finding that in an experiment where the defendant was African–American “the presence of [b]lack group members translated into fewer guilty votes
before deliberations”).
29
100 U.S. 303 (1880).
30
Id. at 308.
31
See id. at 309 (“[P]rejudices often exist against particular classes in the community,
which sway the judgment of jurors.”).
32
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33
See Andrew J. Epstein et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in the Use of High-Volume
Hospitals and Surgeons, 145 ARCHIVES SURGERY 179, 184 (2010) (finding a “persistent pattern” of racial disparities that “play out differently for different minority groups” due to
more than differences in socioeconomic status).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

1084

unknown

Seq: 10

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-JUL-11

15:47

[Vol. 96:1075

come,34 education,35 and housing.36 Not surprisingly, then, lawyers
often incorporate—though not always consciously37—racial stereotypes in the freewheeling practice of jury selection.38 Even the Court
has recognized this reality: just a few years ago, in fact, Justice Breyer
summarized some of these perhaps unconscious racial stereotypes,
such as the general belief that black jurors are more sympathetic toward civil plaintiffs.39 Additionally, because empirical studies have
demonstrated that there may be truth to some of these racial assumptions,40 an attorney might rationally (albeit unconstitutionally) con34

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS TABLE 681: MONEY INCOME
FAMILIES (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/
10s0681.pdf (reporting that in 2007, the median family income by race was $77,133 (Asian,
Pacific Islander households), $64,427 (white households), $40,566 (Hispanic households),
and $40,143 (black households)); see also CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at
13 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p60-236.pdf (noting that
24.7% of blacks and 23.2% of Hispanics were under the poverty threshold, compared to
8.6% of white non-Hispanics and 11.8% of Asians); AJAMU DILLAHUNT ET AL., UNITED FOR A
FAIR ECONOMY, STATE OF THE DREAM 2010: DRAINED—JOBLESS AND FORECLOSED IN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR iii (2010), available at http://www.faireconomy.org/news/state_of_the_
dream_2010_drained (noting that in December 2009 the unemployment rate among African-Americans was 16.2%, for Latinos was 12.9%, and for whites was 9% and that these
rates were higher for African–Americans and Latinos than any other annual rate in nearly
three decades).
35
See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA: TURNING A BLIND
EYE TO INJUSTICE 144 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_
full_report.pdf (noting that “over one third of African-American and Latino students attend schools where 90% or more of the student body is non-white”); GARY ORFIELD, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST CENTURY
CHALLENGE 3 (2009), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/reviving-the-goal-of-an-integrated-society-a-21st-century-challenge/orfield-reviving-the-goal-mlk-2009.pdf.
36
See, e.g., NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 2009: A MESSAGE TO
THE PRESIDENT 22 (2009) (noting that blacks are less likely than whites to own homes and
remain twice as likely as whites to be unemployed, three times more likely to live in poverty, and more than six times as likely to be imprisoned).
37
See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1213–14 (1995)
(“[A] persuasive body of empirical and theoretical research suggests that, in large measure,
people lack access to the mental processes involved in evaluation and judgment, and are
quite poor at accurately attributing the causes of their actions and decisions.”); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.”).
38
See Page, supra note 8, at 210–14.
39
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 271 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
40
See Bowers et al., supra note 27, at 179, 259 (suggesting that a distrust of blacks is
carried into the jury box on the part of whites and is likely the consequence of the “racialization” of certain violent crimes as “black crimes” in popular media and finding that the
greater the proportion of whites to blacks on a jury, the more likely a black defendant was
to be sentenced to death, especially when the victim was white); Ellen S. Cohn et al., Reducing White Juror Bias: The Role of Race Salience and Racial Attitudes, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1953, 1954 (2009) (“[T]he overwhelming consensus among researchers is that [b]lack defendants are more likely to be found guilty than [w]hite defendants, especially when the
OF
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sider race when assembling a sympathetic jury. The accuracy of the
stereotypes, however, is hardly the issue;41 the important point is that,
absent some substantial countervailing force, race-based generalizations will inevitably seep into the jury selection process.
II
THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

AND

BATSON V. KENTUCKY

Before critiquing Batson any further, it is necessary to sketch its
parameters. As the sketch reveals, the Batson framework, although
well intended, is simply not equal to its enormous task.
Any examination of Batson must begin, of course, with the peremptory challenge itself. Peremptory challenges permit a party in a
criminal or civil trial to remove potential jurors during jury selection
peremptorily, that is, “without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court’s control.”42 Although not mandated by the Constitution, “[t]he peremptory challenge has very old
credentials”43 dating back to English common law and beyond. It
continues to be available in all American jurisdictions, with the precise
number of peremptory challenges allotted to any party varying in accordance with the severity of the charge, the type of proceeding
(criminal or civil), and the applicable jurisdiction.44 The Supreme
jurors are [w]hite.”); Lipton, supra note 25, at 282–85; Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in
Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 621, 621–37 (2005) (concluding that black jurors are more lenient toward black
defendants than are white jurors); Perez et al., supra note 25, at 1249. One study explored
negative attitudes toward law enforcement held by blacks. See Rod K. Brunson, “Police Don’t
Like Black People”: African-American Young Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 71, 72, 94–96 (2007), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.
1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00423.x/pdf (demonstrating the negative impact on the trust in
law enforcement by forty black males in an urban setting following adverse experiences
between them and police and their community as a whole and police). Other studies on
mock jurors have attempted to identify racial biases in actual jurors. See, e.g., Steven Fein et
al., Hype and Suspicion: The Effects of Pretrial Publicity, Race, and Suspicion on Jurors’ Verdicts, 53
J. SOC. ISSUES 487, 498 (1997) (noting that participants playing the role of jurors in mock
trials were more likely to convict when they were white than when they were nonwhite);
Sommers, supra note 25, at 172–73 (“[A] larger body of studies converges on the conclusion that [w]hite mock jurors are often harsher in their judgments of out-group vs. ingroup defendants.”). But see Sommers, supra note 25, at 176 (noting skepticism among
mock-juror researchers that “little, if any, reliable relationship exists between a juror’s race
and her decision-making tendencies”).
41
See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972) (plurality opinion) (“It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.”).
42
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
43
Id. at 212.
44
As early as 1790, Congress established that the defendant in a prosecution for treason would have thirty-five peremptory challenges available, and the defendant in any other
prosecution for a felony punishable by death would have twenty such challenges available.
Id. at 214. Over time, Congress altered the number of challenges available to both sides in

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

1086

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-JUL-11

15:47

[Vol. 96:1075

Court has explained that “[t]he persistence of peremptories and their
extensive use” in American jurisdictions “demonstrate[s] the long and
widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial
by jury.”45
While peremptory challenges continue to be widely used in
American jurisdictions, a line of cases beginning with the landmark
1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky46 has tempered their “arbitrary and
capricious”47 nature. In Batson, the Supreme Court overruled Swain v.
Alabama48 to hold that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or
on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.”49 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that race-based peremptory challenges cause injury not only to the defendant and the
excluded juror, but also to “the entire community” by “undermin[ing] public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice.”50
Having identified a constitutional prohibition against the racebased exercise of peremptory challenges, the Supreme Court embarked on the daunting task of fashioning a mechanism to enforce
that prohibition. This task was particularly difficult because of the
Court’s rejection of Justice Marshall’s early call for a relatively clean
a criminal prosecution until, at present, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictate
that in a capital case, each side is entitled to twenty peremptory challenges; in other felony
cases, the defense is entitled to ten, and the prosecution to six, peremptory challenges; and
in misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. Id. The Rules
permit additional challenges with respect to alternate jurors. FED R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(4). In
federal civil trials, each side is generally permitted three peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1870 (2006). Peremptory challenges are also available in state trials. See Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991); Swain, 380 U.S. at 217. In state, noncapital felony trials, the number of peremptory challenges allotted to each side ranges from a
high of twenty to a low of four. See Mary Catherine Campbell, Black, White, and Grey: The
American Jury Project and Representative Juries, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 625, 634 n.69 (2005)
(citing DAVID B. ROTTMAN et al., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, 269–72 tbl.40 (June 2000), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf).
45
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
46
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
47
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
48
The Batson opinion, which was joined by the author of Swain, framed its holding as
a modification rather than as a repudiation of that precedent. This exercise in tact, however, cannot obscure the fact that Batson reached precisely the opposite conclusion as
Swain. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (White, J., concurring) (recognizing that “[t]he Court
overturns the principal holding in Swain”); id. at 100 n.25 (majority opinion) (“To the
extent anything in [Swain] is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is
overruled.”); see also Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 783 (1999) (arguing that despite the Court’s disclaimers, Batson “was
obviously a decision to overturn Swain”).
49
Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
50
Id. at 87.
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solution: the abolition of the peremptory challenge altogether.51
Rather than abandon the venerable peremptory challenge, the Court,
beginning with its decision in Batson, deployed a three-step procedure
designed to stamp out “purposeful” race-based discrimination while at
the same time “permit[ting] prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection
process.”52
The Batson three-step procedure, which has changed little in the
twenty-five years since Batson, is triggered whenever a party moves to
disallow an opponent’s use of a peremptory challenge based on an
allegation of racial discrimination. At the first step, Batson requires
the trial court to consider whether “the totality of the relevant facts”
establishes that the moving party has made out “a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination.”53 Indicia of a prima facie case might include the “‘pattern’ of strikes,” counsel’s “questions and statements
during voir dire,”54 as well as “racial identity between the defendant
and the excused prospective juror.”55
Once a prima facie case of discrimination is established, “the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation.”56 An explanation will not be
considered race neutral if it is based on an “intuitive judgment” or
“assumption” that members of a particular race generally hold certain
51
See id. at 99 n.22 (rejecting Justice Marshall’s suggestion to abolish “this historic
trial practice, which long has served the selection of an impartial jury”); id. at 102–03,
(Marshall, J., concurring) (calling for abolition of peremptory challenge). Justice Breyer
would later echo Justice Marshall’s advocacy of the abolition of the peremptory challenge,
see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J. concurring), as would a continually expanding chorus of commentators, see, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges
Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 864 (1997); Kenneth J.
Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 502–03 (1996); Nelson, supra note 8, at 1723. England abolished
the use of peremptory challenges in 1988. Id. at 1723–24. It permits, however,
nonunanimous verdicts. See Stephen C. Thaman, A Comparative Approach to Teaching Criminal Procedure and Its Application to the Post-Investigative Stage, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 459, 474–75
(2006) (contrasting Europe’s majoritarian verdicts with America’s unanimous ones and
noting that abolishing “peremptory challenges, and go[ing] to a super-majoritarian verdict
(like the 10–2 verdicts allowed in England and Wales . . . )” would likely lead to more
“African-Americans or anti-death penalty jurors on jury panels”).
52
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1991) (plurality opinion); see also
Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 484–85 (2008) (“[T]he question presented at the third
stage of the Batson inquiry is [ ]‘whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.[ ]’” (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 277) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); Johnson v.
California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005).
53
Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94; see Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170 (“[A] defendant satisfies the
requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”).
54
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (emphasis omitted).
55
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991); see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
56
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (per curiam).
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views or are likely to be biased in favor of a particular party.57 Apart
from this requirement, however, “[t]he second step of th[e] process
does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.”58 Rather, the only issue “is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s
explanation,” and “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral.”59
If the proponent of the strike is able to articulate a race-neutral
explanation, the Batson analysis shifts to step three. At this step, the
trial court must evaluate “the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justification for his peremptory strike”60 by assessing its “plausibility . . . in
light of all evidence with a bearing on it.”61 Given the nature of the
voir dire proceedings, “[t]here will seldom be much evidence bearing
on th[is] issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of
the attorney who exercises the challenge.”62 The ultimate question
invariably “comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible,” which “can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how
reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether
the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.”63
57
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98 (“[A]ssumptions[ ] which arise solely from the jurors’
race” will not survive step two); see Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (“This
Court firmly has rejected the view that assumptions of partiality based on race provide a
legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror. . . . [T]he exercise of a
peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party.”).
58
Elem, 514 U.S. at 767–68, 769 (stating that a “legitimate reason” for a strike “is not a
reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.”); Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“A neutral explanation . . . means
an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror.”). Dissenting from
the four-page per curiam opinion in Elem, Justice Stevens contended that the case represented “a law-changing decision” that “overrules a portion of our opinion in Batson”—
specifically that a second step explanation must be “trial related.” 514 U.S. at 770, 775
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (stating that at step two, the prosecutor “must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried”).
59
Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
359 (plurality opinion) (“In evaluating the race neutrality of an attorney’s explanation, a
court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.”).
60
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–39 (2003).
61
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251–52 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (“The trial
court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful
discrimination.”).
62
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 339 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (plurality
opinion)).
63
Id.; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he decisive question will be
whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (“[T]he trial judge’s findings in the context under
consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility.”). Other relevant factors
include the likelihood that a proffered reason for a strike will “result[ ] in the dispropor-
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Although the Court intended the procedure set forth in Batson to
enforce the constitutional prohibition of race-based jury selection in a
specific scenario—the prosecutor’s removal of black jurors in a criminal proceeding against a black defendant—its applicability gradually
expanded to encompass essentially every conceivable instance of jury
selection and to include gender-based as well as race-based discrimination. This expansion fit with the Court’s increased focus on the equal
protection rights of stricken jurors, rather than those of criminal defendants. As the Court has explained, “whether the trial is criminal or
civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection
right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-sponsored
group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.”64
Thus, Batson challenges can be made and won on the grounds of race
as well as gender discrimination,65 by litigants in civil cases,66 by the
prosecution and the defense in criminal cases,67 and by defendants
(or other litigants) who do not share the racial or gender characteristics of the improperly stricken juror.68
In a series of cases decided after Batson, the Supreme Court gradually relegated the first and second steps in the Batson process to a
nonsubstantive, procedural role akin to the complaint and answer in
civil pleadings. As now interpreted, the first two steps merely “govern
the production of evidence that allows the trial court to determine,” at
step three, “the persuasiveness of the defendant’s constitutional
claim.”69 It is, then, this third step—the adjudication of the validity of
the justification proffered for a disputed peremptory challenge—that
is preeminent in the three-step Batson process.
In tandem with its narrowing of the substantive focus of the Batson inquiry to the third step of the process, the Supreme Court also
established that the trial court’s step three determinations must be
“accorded great deference,”70 rendering those determinations essentially unreviewable on appeal. The Court justifies this deference on
practical grounds: the Batson process is necessarily fact intensive, and
many of the critical facts, such as the demeanor of an attorney or prospective juror, will not be apparent from the appellate record, which
tionate exclusion of members of a certain race,” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363 (plurality opinion), and any “[r]acial identity between the defendant and the excused person,” which
“may provide one of the easier cases to establish both a prima facie case and a conclusive
showing that wrongful discrimination has occurred,” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416
(1991).
64
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994).
65
Id. at 128–29.
66
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).
67
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
68
See Powers, 499 U.S. at 415–16.
69
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 (2005).
70
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991) (plurality opinion).
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generally consists of “only the transcripts from voir dire.”71 Understandably, a step-three determination “based on demeanor and credibility” implicates an area of inquiry that “lies ‘peculiarly within a trial
judge’s province’” and is poorly suited to second guessing on
appeal.72
III
THE CONTINUED IMPOTENCE OF BATSON IN APPLICATION: A
REVIEW OF CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT
FROM 2000 TO 2009
[W]e now consider the charade that has become the Batson process.
The State may provide the trial court with a series of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges. . . . Surely, new
prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, “Handy RaceNeutral Explanations” or “20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.” It might include: too old, too young, divorced, “long, unkempt hair,” free-lance writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of
family contact, attempting to make eye-contact with defendant,
“lived in an area consisting predominantly of apartment complexes,” single, over-educated, lack of maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed, improper attire, juror lived alone, misspelled
place of employment, living with girlfriend, unemployed spouse,
spouse employed as school teacher, employment as part-time barber, friendship with city council member, failure to remove hat . . . .
—Justice Greiman73

While Illinois Appeals Court Justice Greiman’s analysis may be
dripping with equal parts sarcasm, humor, and contempt, his list accurately characterizes the catalogue of explanations that various courts
have upheld in the near-quarter century of Batson jurisprudence.74 In
fact, one need only read a handful of cases to find examples from
Justice Grieman’s list. For example, in the 2009 case of People v. Hamilton, the California Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s challenge
71

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
Id. (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (plurality opinion)); Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
364 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a
finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.”). The great deference
afforded to the trial court in this circumstance is quite natural and accords with the deference applied in virtually all appellate tribunals to a trial court’s credibility determination.
See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985) (recognizing that a trial court’s determination of whether a juror is biased will generally be “based upon determinations of demeanor
and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province” and are “entitled to deference” on appeal).
73
People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
74
Marvin L. Longabaugh, The Z-Test for Percentages: A Statistical Tool to Detect Pretextually
Neutral Juror Challenges, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (Dec. 2006) (quoting Justice Greiman’s
analysis and suggesting that “each of the above reasons would actually survive a Batson
challenge under Purkett”).
72
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to the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes to remove all six of
the black venirepersons.75 In so doing, the court recognized a laundry list of excuses that can successfully rebut allegations of race-based
juror exclusion:
Lacked “family values”
“[H]ad considerable sympathy for [b]lack people on trial”
“[U]nkempt and slovenly appearance”
“[N]ot smart enough to serve on the jury”
“[C]ame from a family that did not have ‘an abiding respect for the
rule of law’”
“[F]elt the death penalty law treated [b]lack people unfairly”
“[H]arbored a ‘wholly naı̈ve view of the criminal mind’”
“[H]ad family members in prison”
“[U]nwed 33-year-old mother of a 14-year-old boy”
Too young
Considered the justice system unfair to blacks
“[D]ressed like a 15-year-old, with baggy clothes”
Not mature enough
Lacked “hope in the legal system”
Single
Failed to rise “above the rank of Petty Officer First Class after
serving 20 years in the Navy”76

While the trial court in Hamilton admitted that the prosecutor’s “credibility [was] beginning to wear a little thin,”77 it permitted the strikes,
and the California Supreme Court deemed the prosecution’s reasons
sufficient under Batson to rebut the defense’s allegation of a racial
motive.78
Of course, cases like People v. Hamilton and Commonwealth v. Cook
could be unrepresentative of most Batson claims. In addition, older
studies suggesting that these cases are indeed representative79 may
75

200 P.3d 898, 929–37 (Cal. 2009).
Id.
77
Id. at 936.
78
Id. at 929–37.
79
See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10, 45, 127–30 (2001) (concluding after
an “analysis of 317 capital murder cases tried by jury in Philadelphia between 1981 and
1997” that “discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race and
gender by both prosecutors and defense counsel is widespread” and that “United States
Supreme Court decisions banning these practices appear to have had only a marginal impact”); Melilli, supra note 51, at 448, 503 (surveying “reported decision[s] of every federal
and state court applying Batson” between 1986 and 1993 and concluding, in light of, inter
76
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simply be reflective of a different era. Thus, to determine whether
Hamilton and Cook are representative of modern practice, we undertook our own exhaustive examination of all opinions and orders between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009 in which a federal
court evaluated a race-based Batson challenge in either a civil or criminal case.80 Ultimately, we unearthed 269 federal decisions.
Our first finding, that federal courts provided little relief to Batson claimants, is no surprise given that in each decision reviewed, the
Batson movant had failed initially in the trial court, and the trial court
is afforded great deference under Batson.81 Our analysis reveals that
of 269 federal decisions between 2000 and 2009, the reviewing court
granted a new trial in only eighteen cases—6.69% of the total. In an
additional ten cases—3.7%—the reviewing court remanded to the
trial court to determine whether the second or third step of the Batson
inquiry was satisfied in light of the trial court’s error in handling either the first or second step of the Batson inquiry. In an additional
twelve cases—4.5%—the reviewing court affirmed the decision below,
in part, by upholding the lower court’s finding that the appellant or
petitioner violated Batson.82 In the remaining 85.1% cases, the court
rejected the Batson claim altogether.83
Our interest, however, was as much in the proceedings in the trial
court as in those on review. Indeed, given the inherent limits of our
survey, we could not hope to determine anything conclusive about the
likelihood of success of initial Batson challenges. For one thing, to the
extent the defense is initially successful in a Batson challenge, a judicial opinion will almost never reflect it; prosecutors will have no desire
alia, the nature of race-neutral reasons permitted to explain a challenged strike, “Batson is
almost surely a failure,” and “[i]t is time for the peremptory challenge to go”); Raphael &
Ungvarsky, supra note 8, at 234, 237 (reviewing Batson challenges in opinions issued by
federal and state courts between 1986 and 1992 and concluding that “given the current
case law, a prosecutor who wishes to offer a pretext for a race-based strike is unlikely to
encounter difficulty in crafting a neutral explanation”).
80
We reviewed all published and unpublished decisions available on Westlaw from
the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and federal district courts that no other court has explicitly affirmed, reversed, overruled, or vacated on the Batson issue prior to January 1,
2010. To avoid duplication, we eliminated opinions of different courts reviewing the same
case. Additionally, we did not design our survey to discover opinions that either are not
included in the Westlaw database or are conclusory opinions (e.g., one sentence orders
stating “the petition is denied”) that denied Batson claims without identifying them.
81
See discussion supra Part II.
82
The Batson claimants in these cases were either the losing party in a civil case or the
defendant in a criminal case.
83
In this 85.1%, we include the handful of cases in which an appeals court affirmed a
lower court’s decision to grant the prosecution’s Batson claim(s) and reseat a juror struck
by the defense. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110, 116–17 (holding that
the defendants’ facially neutral reasons for striking a white venireperson were a pretext for
racial discrimination).
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to appeal a successful defense challenge when a defendant is convicted, and no ability to do so when the defendant is acquitted.
Our inquiry was less ambitious but, nevertheless, still significant.
What we sought to explore, and what our survey in fact reveals, is that
cases like People v. Hamilton and Commonwealth v. Cook are not aberrations but symptoms of a continuing and systemic problem. As discussed below, the last decade of federal court opinions reflect that
prosecutors regularly respond to a defendant’s prima facie case of racially motivated jury selection with tepid, almost laughable “race-neutral” reasons, as well as purportedly “race-neutral” reasons that
strongly correlate with race. More significantly, we found that courts
accept those reasons as sufficient to establish the absence of a racial
motivation under Batson, and almost without exception, those reasons
survive subsequent scrutiny in the federal courts. Batson is a response
to the “fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory
challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits ‘those to
discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’”84 Our study suggests that the Batson response is as ineffective as a lone chopstick.
A. Acceptable Reasons for Peremptory Strikes
In the cases we surveyed, the race-neutral explanations proffered
for a peremptory strike run the gamut. Many of the reasons submitted were, if true, reasons that would be either grounds for striking for
cause (e.g., venireperson’s sister was married to one of the prosecution’s witnesses85) or explanations that few attorneys would deny are
valid grounds to strike a prospective juror:
“[A]ppeared intoxicated”86
Appear[ed] to fall asleep during voir dire87
Failed to disclose her own criminal history88
Unsure of ability to follow court’s instructions89
Read National Enquirer during voir dire90
84
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,
562 (1953)).
85
Woods v. Cain, No. 04-361, 2007 WL 2480351, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2007).
86
Lettley v. Walsh, No. 01-5812, 2007 WL 4590019, at *12 (E.D.N.Y Dec. 20, 2007).
87
See United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the
government’s use of a peremptory challenge did not violate Batson where an African-American juror “‘had her eyes closed for extended periods of time’ as if she had been sleeping”); Hayes v. Quarterman, No. 05-1974, 2007 WL 4440951, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
2007).
88
Johnson v. Quarterman, No. 03-2606, 2007 WL 2735638, at *13–14 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
18, 2007).
89
Hargrove v. Pliler, No. 03-1141, 2007 WL 2245737, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2007).
90
Llaca v. Duncan, No. 01-9367, 2004 WL 964113, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2004).
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Requested to “see the cash” when prosecution mentioned stolen
property91

Also in capital cases, venirepersons were struck because of their hesitancy to impose a death sentence.92
Another major category of accepted explanations related to the
demeanor of the prospective juror. A demeanor-based explanation
arose in almost half of the cases. While some cases indicated specific
hostile behavior toward one party, most of the explanations were
vague hunches or feelings about jurors with tenuous connections to
the nature of the case:
Failed to make eye contact93
Appeared bewildered94
Seemed nervous95
Had “an angry look that she wasn’t happy to be here”96
Gave “smart-ass answer[s]”97
Had a “strong personality”98
“[W]ore a beret one day and a sequined cap the next”99

In about twelve cases, the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations
for at least one venireperson did not extend beyond the juror’s demeanor—i.e., the explanation did not involve the prospective juror’s
education, occupation, age, experience with the police or justice system, hardship explanations, life experience, or connection to any of
the witnesses.100 For example, in Elder v. Berghuis, the trial court accepted a prosecutor’s explanation that he struck one particular juror
91

Price v. Cain, No. 03-3066, 2007 WL 433484, at *5 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2007).
A potential juror can be struck for cause in a capital case if she expresses an inability to impose a death sentence. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992) (“[A] juror
who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is
not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.”). So-called death qualification may
itself have racial implications. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of
Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1463 (1997)
(“Death-qualified juries are less likely to share the racial and status characteristics or the
common life experiences with capital defendants that would otherwise enable them to
bridge the vast differences in behavior the trial is designed to highlight.”).
93
Simon v. Epps, No. 04-26, 2007 WL 4292498, at *31 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 30, 2007).
94
Derrickson v. Myers, No. 07-1917, 2007 WL 4289979, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2007).
95
Woods v. Cain, No. 04-361, 2007 WL 2480351, at *5 (M.D. La. Aug. 28, 2007).
96
United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 2009).
97
Ali v. Hickman, No. 05-5243, 2007 WL 2417377, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24 2007).
98
United States v. Fields, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331 (E.D. Okla. 2005).
99
Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
100
See, e.g., United States v. Prather, 279 F. App’x 761, 766 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of two African-American jurors based on the fact
that “she had stricken [those potential jurors] after sensing they might be biased against
the Government based on their demeanor when describing their personal histories”).
92
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solely “based on a ‘gut feeling’ that ‘something didn’t feel right with
her.’”101
We also discovered numerous explanations that rested on assumptions about venirepersons with various traits largely unrelated to
race or gender:
Watched science fiction programs on television102
Too “grandmotherly”103
Too young104
Had a dental abscess105
Divorced106
Unmarried107
Held Bible in hand108
Graduated with a Theatre Arts degree109
“[M]entioned the word ‘government’ twice in his answers”110
Wore t-shirts111
Wore earrings in each ear112
Wore a nose ring113
Lacked outside hobbies and interests114
Worked in customer service115
Unemployed116
101

644 F. Supp. 2d 888, 895–96 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
United States v. Smith, 272 F. App’x 811, 813 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
103
Hayes v. Quarterman, No. 05-1974, 2007 WL 4440951, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
2007). While “grandmotherly” is clearly a gender-specific term, the prosecutor seemed to
be using the term to suggest an age-based stereotype, as opposed to a gender-based
stereotype.
104
Brown v. Klem, No. 07-1250, 2007 WL 2907953, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2007).
105
United States v. Walley, 567 F.3d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 2009).
106
Cole v. Roper, No. 05-131, 2007 WL 1460460, at *4 (E.D. Mo. May 16, 2007).
107
Lewis v. Bennett, 435 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191–92 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
108
Lockridge v. Franklin, No. 02-729, 2006 WL 2021493, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 17,
2006).
109
United States v. Rodriguez, No. 04-55, 2007 WL 466752, at *32 (D.N.D. Feb. 12,
2007).
110
United States v. Ervin, 266 F. App’x 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2008).
111
Cook v. La Marque, No. 02-2240, 2007 WL 3243864, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007).
112
United States v. Claytor, No. 05-0007, 2005 WL 1745642, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 26,
2005).
113
Bush v. Portuondo, No. 02-2883, 2003 WL 23185751, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2003).
114
Lewis v. Bennett, 435 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
115
Reynoso v. Hall, No. 04-5025, 2007 WL 3096886, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2007).
116
United States v. Carter, No. 04-0404, 2006 WL 1128740, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 24,
2006).
102
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Worked as a teacher117
Worked as a nightclub manager118
Worked at the post office119
Seemed to “‘over-intellectualize’ the case”120
Served on a jury that previously acquitted a criminal defendant121

Many of the above explanations had a tenuous connection, at
best, to the trial; in one case, the prosecutor even admitted that the
explanation was “rather a stretch.”122 However, the courts approving
these explanations often cited the Supreme Court’s rule that a trial
judge must accept even “silly or superstitious” explanations at step two
so long as the explanations are facially race and gender neutral; moreover, the Court further dictates that lower courts can reject those reasons at step three only if they find that the attorney is lying.123
Perhaps our most revealing discovery was the substantial list of
acceptable reasons that could conceivably implicate a juror’s likelihood of being impartial but were likely to disproportionately impact
specific racial or ethnic groups. For example, several black venirepersons were struck because they had relatives who had been convicted
and imprisoned.124 Similarly, in one case, a black venireperson was
struck because she had previously testified in another criminal trial in
support of a criminal defendant’s self-defense claim.125 In another
case, the Second Circuit accepted a prosecutor’s “general practice” of
avoiding “jurors who had family members who had either been arrested or undergone negative experiences with the police” or “harbored negative feelings about the police.”126
117
McGahee v. Campbell, No. 05-0042, 2007 WL 3037451, at *49 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 15,
2007), rev’d sub nom, McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009).
118
Crawford v. Zon, No. 04-34, 2005 WL 857056, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2005).
119
Carter v. Duncan, No. 02-0586, 2005 WL 2373572, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2005).
120
Ali v. Hickman, No. 05-5243, 2007 WL 2417377, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24 2007).
121
United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2008).
122
See United States v. Smith, 272 F. App’x 811, 813 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(finding no Batson violation where the government struck jurors based on their television
viewing habits).
123
See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (explaining that only at
step three of a Batson challenge can “implausible or fantastic justifications . . . be found to
be pretexts for purposeful discrimination”); see also Smith, 272 F. App’x at 813 (per curiam)
(“About the second step, almost any plausible reason can satisfy the striking party’s burden, including reasons deemed superstitious, silly, or trivial, as long as the reason is race or
gender neutral.”).
124
See, e.g., United States v. McKay, 431 F.3d 1085, 1092 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the strike of a black venireperson was appropriate and nondiscriminatory because, among
other things, she had a cousin and brother who had both been convicted for drug
offenses).
125
See United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 2009).
126
Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 300 (2d Cir. 2005).
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While most courts would consider explanations such as a
venireperson’s acquaintance or family relationship with a person in
prison as “race neutral,” such a conclusion is called into question by
the stark racial disparities in the criminal justice system. For example,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported in 2008 that “black males were
incarcerated at 6.6 times the rate of white males”; whereas only 1 in
138 white males were in prison or jail, 1 in 21 black males were incarcerated.127 Moreover, the Bureau estimated that 32% of black men
born in 2001 will be imprisoned at least once during their lifetime,
compared to 17.2% of Latinos and 5.9% of white men.128 Therefore,
striking all persons with a relative who is or has been in prison will
disproportionately exclude minority venirepersons.
Moreover, many of the race-neutral criteria upheld in our survey
played into racial stereotypes and might reflect subconscious bias. A
prosecutor’s vague reference to the “intelligence” of a venireperson,
for example, often withstood a Batson challenge even when the estimation of intelligence was not based on educational level, language barriers, IQ, vocabulary, Jeopardy winnings, or any other specified way of
gauging the venireperson’s ability to follow the trial.129 For example,
in Williams v. Norris, the Eighth Circuit reviewed the prosecution’s
strike of an African-American woman.130 At trial, the State explained
that the venireperson “had only a high school education” and that
they “wanted to ‘get the best educated jurors that we can’ because it
planned to introduce complex DNA evidence.”131 However, the defense demonstrated that at least eight white venirepersons had only a
high school education or less and were not struck.132 When the trial
judge asked the state why it struck the black juror but kept another
similarly-situated white juror, the prosecutor explained:
[The African-American venireperson] did not appear to me to be
bright when I was talking to her. She also was a shipping clerk for
Maybelline. All of these things worried me in conjunction with
DNA. [The white juror who also only had a high school education]
appeared to be articulate. She’s also a manager of a store. I felt like
127
Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Growth in Prison
and Jail Populations Slowing: 16 States Report Declines in the Number of Prisoners (Mar.
31, 2009), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2009/BJS0903
31.htm.
128
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003), available at http:/
/bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf).
129
But see McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the record did not support and the court should have considered the prosecution’s removal of multiple African-American jurors because of their “low intelligence”).
130
576 F.3d 850, 863–65 (8th Cir. 2009).
131
Id. at 863.
132
See id. at 864.
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that . . . boded well for the DNA—understanding the DNA
evidence.133

Despite the fact that the prosecution conducted no further questioning of the struck African-American juror to indicate why she
would be any less able to understand DNA evidence than the eight
other white jurors whose education level was identical, the trial court,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the district court, and the Eighth Circuit all concluded that no Batson error had been committed.134 In
effect, the prosecution was permitted to strike a black venireperson
with a high school education merely because she “did not appear . . . to
be bright” while seating a white venireperson with only a high school
education who “appeared to be articulate.”135 While we acknowledge
that the voir dire transcript may not capture specific physical interactions that might further validate the prosecutor’s hunch, we have no
difficulty concluding that the race-neutral explanation given plays into
one of the worst stereotypes of African-Americans.136
In all of these situations, the courts upheld the proffered reasons
as race neutral and “not otherwise vague or facially questionable.”137
Under the current Batson framework, the courts had no obligation to
rule otherwise, even if presented with clear evidence of how such
“race-neutral” criteria were likely to disparately impact specific groups.
In sum, in the cases reviewed, the reasons advanced to successfully justify questionable peremptory strikes were commonly the same
type of reasons given by the prosecutors in Hamilton and Cook. Further, another broad subset of reasons encountered, while not racebased per se, seem to correlate with race, suggesting that an attorney
seeking to eliminate all the members of a certain race from the jury
133
Id. at 864 (omission in original) (“In denying the challenge to [the] strike, the trial
judge explained: ‘I think the high school [education] was probably [an] inappropriate way
to say it, but I think [the State] felt that from her responses and her background that
perhaps she wasn’t the person they wanted because of her ability to understand the evidence in this case.’” (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)).
134
Id. at 865.
135
Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
136
See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL AMERICA
108–09 (1993) (noting that stereotypes of “black mental inferiority” have been historically
“used to support the notion of white supremacy and to justify racial segregation”); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Race and Capital Punishment, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY
121, 137 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (“[T]he majority group sees African Americans as
less intelligent, less hard-working, less patriotic—less good . . . —than white Americans.”);
see also McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
State’s claim that several African-Americans were of ‘low intelligence’ is a particularly suspicious explanation given the role that the claim of ‘low intelligence’ has played in the history of racial discrimination from juries.”); cf. Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 8, at 255
(reporting “routine[ ]” prosecution strikes of potential jurors based on claims that the jurors “lack formal education or . . . appear inarticulate”).
137
Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 301 (2d Cir. 2005).
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could achieve much of that goal by focusing on purportedly “raceneutral” factors that happen to correlate with race.
B. Unacceptable Reasons for Peremptory Strikes
The federal courts in our study never reversed based on a reason’s facial implausibility.138 Of the eighteen successful139 posttrial
Batson challenges we encountered, ten involved undeniable evidence
of implausibility based on side-by-side comparisons of similarly situated jurors of different races.140 These rulings follow the Supreme
Court’s recognition that “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove
purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson‘s third step.”141
One of the Supreme Court’s more recent Batson-related opinions,
Snyder v. Louisiana,142 exemplifies how such a side-by-side comparison—effectively proving that any race-neutral explanations are pretexts
for racial discrimination—is the circumstance most likely to convince
a court to grant a Batson challenge on appeal. In Snyder, the Court
held that the prosecution’s first proffered reason for striking an African-American juror—nervousness—was insufficient by itself because
the record did not indicate that the trial judge credited the prosecutor’s assertion.143 This left the second reason—the juror’s studentteaching obligations—with too much weight to bear. The Court considered the justification implausible in light of the brevity of the trial
138
In a few cases, federal courts have concluded that a specific reason for striking a
juror was facially invalid but nonetheless concluded that the strike did not violate Batson
because other proffered reasons were valid. See, e.g., United States v. Walley, 567 F.3d 354,
357 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the trial court concluded that an African-American juror’s
back problem was not a valid ground upon which to strike her but that her health
problems and “connection to a person with substance-abuse issues were sufficient reasons
to justify the strike”).
139
This number does not include cases remanded for further Batson hearings.
140
See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 483–85 (2008); Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d
1174, 1193–96 (9th Cir. 2009); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 375–81 (5th Cir. 2009);
Green v. Lamarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1030–33 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Williamson,
533 F.3d 269, 275–77 (5th Cir. 2008); Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2001);
Williams v. Runnels, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Love v. Yates, 586
F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1169–71, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Hardcastle v. Horn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 388,
405–23 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Hargrove v. Pliler, No. 03-1141, 2007 WL 2245737, at *10–20 (E.D.
Cal. July 31, 2007).
141
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005).
142
552 U.S. 472 (2008).
143
Id. at 479. The Court did not suggest, however, that “nervousness” was an otherwise improper ground for striking a juror. Moreover, the Court noted that “the record
does not show that the prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged [the stricken
juror] based on his nervousness alone.” Id. at 485.
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and because the prosecutor struck white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations at least as serious as those of the stricken juror.144
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Reed v. Quarterman concluded that
the prosecution’s proffered reasons for striking at least two prospective African-American jurors were pretexts for discrimination.145 In
explaining why they struck one juror, the state prosecuting attorneys
explained that the stricken juror (1) “would impose the death penalty
only ‘if the facts [were] presented to [him] beyond a shadow of
doubt,’” (2) “would need to see ‘a little premeditation’ to convict for
capital murder,” and (3) “was concerned about losing his job if he was
gone from work for a long time.”146 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the proffered explanations were pretexts for racial discrimination in
light of evidence that other white jurors expressed nearly identical
opinions and concerns but were not similarly struck or questioned further.147 The court also rested its opinion on historical evidence of
racial bias, evidenced by use of the same Sparling Manual used by the
Dallas County District Attorney’s Office that the Supreme Court relied
on to find a Batson violation in Miller-El v. Dretke.148
In Hardcastle v. Horn, a Pennsylvania district court concluded that
the state’s proffered race-neutral reasons for striking multiple nonwhite potential jurors were pretextual in light of the defendant’s exhaustive side-by-side comparisons of eight of the black venire
members stricken by the state with their white counterparts in the venire.149 The trial prosecutor, for example, argued that she struck Lisa
Stewart, a black woman, in keeping with her usual practice of striking
young, single, unemployed, unmarried mothers.150 The record, however, clearly demonstrated that four other women in the venire fit a
similar description, three of whom were Caucasian, but that the prosecutor still struck only Stewart.151 The district court found that the
prosecutor treated Stewart differently than other similarly situated
members of the venire.152
Many of the decisions that resulted in a remand for a new Batson
hearing also stemmed from a failure to properly apply the compara144

Id. at 483.
555 F.3d 364, 376 (5th Cir. 2009).
146
Id. at 378.
147
Id. at 379–80.
148
Id. at 381–82 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 263–64 (2005)); Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. at 264 (2005) (explaining that the Sparling manual “contained an article
authored by a former prosecutor (and later a judge) under the direction of his superiors in
the District Attorney’s Office, outlining the reasoning for excluding minorities from jury
service”).
149
521 F. Supp. 2d 388, 405–23 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
150
Id. at 405–06.
151
Id. at 408.
152
Id.
145
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tive-analysis test. In United States v. Torres-Ramos, for example, the
Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether the
third step of Batson was satisfied.153 In that case, the prosecution
struck an African-American juror on the grounds that (1) his education consisted of a high school diploma and a few community college
classes and (2) he had been laid off from his job as a factory
worker.154 The court’s remand stemmed from the fact that the district court, in ruling on a Batson claim, conducted a side-by-side comparison of the excluded African-American juror with white
venirepersons who were similarly excluded, as opposed to a comparison
with similarly situated white venirepersons who had not been
excluded.155
The other common scenario in the cases that led to reversal was a
prosecutor justifying a strike by referencing a statement the juror
never made or something that the record did not support.156 For example, in Durant v. Strack, the prosecutor explained the strike of a
black juror on the grounds that the juror was making faces and appeared hostile.157 The state trial court allowed the strike, although it
stated that the juror did not appear to be hostile and that it did not
see the juror make any faces.158 The federal district court, however,
granted the defendant’s habeas petition on the grounds the state trial
court’s ruling was contrary to Batson and its progeny.159 Similarly, in
McGahee v. Alabama Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the prosecution’s explanation for striking jurors because of their
“low intelligence” had no support in the record.160
In all but one of the remaining cases, the reviewing court granted
a new trial simply because the trial court failed to properly apply the
Batson framework: In Love v. Yates, the district court ruled that the
state trial court failed to conduct a comparative analysis.161 In Paulino
v. Harrison, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s habeas grant
because the trial court did not require the prosecution to explain the
strikes and the prosecutor was then unable to remember any reasons
153

536 F.3d 542, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 558.
155
Id. at 560.
156
A court may deem a mistake, however, a valid race-neutral reason for a peremptory
challenge. See People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 735 (Cal. 1997) (rejecting a Batson challenge where prosecutor’s “race-neutral” justification for the strike was that he mistakenly
struck the juror, while acknowledging “the possibility . . . that counsel called upon to explain a questionable peremptory challenge will take refuge in a disingenuous claim the
challenge was mistakenly made”).
157
151 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
158
See id. at 231–32.
159
Id. at 235.
160
560 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009).
161
586 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
154
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for the strike.162 In Sims v. Berghuis, the court noted that the prosecutor offered no explanation at trial for excusing one juror.163
The final category of reasons that triggered reversal consists of
situations where the court granted a defendant’s Batson claim based
on unambiguous evidence that the prosecutor’s proffered justification
was false. In Weddell v. Weber, for example, the prosecution put a question mark by the name of a Native American juror before even seeing
or questioning her.164
In sum, reviewing courts based all eighteen reversals on virtually
conclusive proof that the prosecutor was not telling the truth. Which is
to say, a reviewing court’s skepticism about proffered justifications
that were far-fetched, tenuously connected to the case, strongly correlated with race, or irreducibly vague and ambiguous did not form the
basis for granting the reversals.
C. Implications of These Results: Jurors Are More Likely to Be
Struck by Lightning than to Be Struck by a Violator of
the Equal Protection Clause
Our survey reveals that in a broad array of cases, as exemplified
by Hamilton and Cook, attorneys articulate and judges accept “raceneutral” explanations for peremptory strikes that either highly correlate with race or are silly, trivial, or irrelevant to the case. Reviewing
courts then affirm these determinations. This is significant because if
attorneys can avoid Batson in this manner, there are only two narrow
circumstances in which a Batson challenge is likely to succeed: (1)
where an attorney admits to a racial motivation and (2) where an attorney’s explanation applies to a virtually identical juror of a different
race who was not stricken.165 As discussed below, these two scenarios
in which Batson will likely smoke out a racially discriminatory strike are
exceedingly unlikely.
One circumstance where Batson is well poised to invalidate a
strike is where an attorney concedes a racial motivation at step two.
Even if we would somehow expect counsel to acknowledge unconstitutional racial discrimination in open court, however, attorneys will
often fail to perceive their own racial motivation.166 Psychological
studies suggest that people readily provide a nonracial explanation for
162

542 F.3d 692, 699–700, 703 (9th Cir. 2008).
494 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
164
290 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1026–29 (D.S.D. 2003).
165
As noted above, a trial court may disbelieve a prosecutor’s proffered justification
and disallow the strike in the first instance, at which point the strike largely disappears
from the judicial record. But as discussed infra Part V, significant obstacles hamper such
rulings, and we found no evidence of their prevalence in the cases we studied.
166
See Page, supra note 8, at 210–15.
163

R
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their behavior even when race is actually influencing their decision.167
Most notably, Professors Samuel Sommers and Michael Norton recently conducted a study in which they asked three populations—college students, advanced law students, and practicing attorneys—to
play the role of prosecuting a twenty-four-year-old black male defendant in a robbery and aggravated assault trial.168 Each “prosecutor”
was given one remaining peremptory strike with instructions to strike
one of two prospective jurors because either “(a) you don’t think they
would be able to be fair jurors or (b) you do not think they would be
sympathetic to your case.”169 Both jurors were given a trait that was
likely to be unattractive to a prosecutor. Juror #1 was a forty-threeyear-old married male journalist who had, several years earlier, written
articles about police misconduct. Juror #2 was a forty-year-old divorced male advertising executive who stated during voir dire that he
was skeptical of statistics because they are easily manipulated.170
Photos of the hypothetical veniremen accompanied the descriptions
of the jurors; however, half of each population saw that Juror #1 was
black and Juror #2 was white, while the other half saw that Juror #1
was white and Juror #2 was black.171
Sommers and Norton discovered that all three populations were
more likely to challenge a prospective juror when he was black as opposed to white.172 However, when justifying their strikes from the
myriad factors provided, the participants rarely cited race as an influential factor. Rather, they focused instead
on the race-neutral characteristics associated with the [b]lack prospective juror. That is, when Juror #1 was [b]lack, participants
tended to justify their judgments by citing his familiarity with police
misconduct as their reason for excluding him. When Juror #2 was
[b]lack, on the other hand, participants reported his skepticism
about statistics to be more important than the police misconduct
issue.173
167
See, e.g., Michael I. Norton et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision Making, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 36, 39–40
(2006) (arguing that social category information can subconsciously affect decision making and that people are skilled at masking such behavior that may be viewed negatively by
others).
168
Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 261, 265 (2007).
169
Id. at 266.
170
Id. at 265.
171
Id. at 266.
172
Specifically, participants struck Juror #1 77% of the time when he was black but
only 53% of the time when he was white. Similarly, participants challenged Juror #2 47%
of the time when he was black but only 23% when he was white. Id. at 267.
173
Id. at 269.
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Perhaps the most significant result of the Sommers and Norton
study is that the evidence of racial bias only became clear when viewing the data in the aggregate.174 Thus, if a court were to look at only
one individual’s responses—e.g., “I struck Juror #1 because he probably distrusts the police”—it would be impossible to conclude that his
explanation was pretextual. Yet the aggregate data demonstrates that
race played a role in the strikes.175
The results of the Sommers and Norton study demonstrate why
judges will inevitably struggle to discredit proffered race-neutral explanations. Any investigation will be unproductive because attorneys not
only are hesitant to admit bias but also may not even be aware of their
bias. Thus, except in unusual cases where there is unambiguous evidence that the proffered justification was false or where there is clear
evidence of implausibility based on side-by-side comparisons of similarly situated jurors of different races, aggregated data (which will be
unavailable to the trial court) is required to conclusively establish racial bias.
Unfortunately, any attorney smart enough to pass a bar exam can
easily circumvent the comparative-analysis pitfall by “packaging” additional characteristics in a way that makes it statistically impossible that
another individual will have an identical response. Consider, for example, that if a venire of sixty persons were to answer a dozen multiple choice questions with only four possible answers and each person
answered randomly, the likelihood that two of those sixty people
174
See id. (“We observed bias against [b]lack venire members only when examining
decisions made by several participants; indeed, for any given participant, we are unable to
determine whether the peremptory [strike] was influenced by race or whether the justification provided was valid.”).
175
Anecdotally, we attempted to replicate this experiment in Professor Semitsu’s
Spring 2011 Constitutional Law II course at the University of San Diego Law School.
Ninety-two students were shown images of two smiling, male, middle-aged venirepersons in
suits; one was black, and the other was white. Asked to assume the role of a prosecutor in a
robbery trial with a black defendant and a white victim, the students received the same
descriptions of the two jurors and were instructed to only strike one. Unbeknownst to
them, half the class received a paper stating that the black male was the “43-year-old married journalist who wrote articles about police misconduct and never served on a jury
before” while the other half was given that same description for the white venireperson.
After conducting an anonymous survey, we learned that 92.5% of the class struck that
journalist when it was the black man, but only 76.3% struck that journalist when it was the
white man. Conversely, when offered a chance to strike a “40-year-old divorced advertising
executive who has served on a jury once before in a civil trial and is skeptical of statistics
because they are easily manipulated,” 23.7% of the class struck him when he was black, but
only 7.5% of the class struck him when he was white. Given the fact that these law students
chose to take a class on the Equal Protection Clause, we do not suggest that these results
reflect the larger USD Law School student body, much less all law students or society in
general. Nonetheless, despite a participant pool of ninety-two students who had already
spent several weeks discussing invidious race discrimination, we found that the conscious
or subconscious use of race played a statistically significant role in the students’ decision to
strike jurors.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 31

WIDENING BATSON’S NET

6-JUL-11

15:47

1105

would have identical responses would be 0.0105501%.176 In other
words, if a prosecutor needed to explain why she was striking one prospective juror (of sixty) and used that venireperson’s answers to twelve
questions as an explanation, the odds of any of the remaining fiftynine people having identical answers would be approximately 1 in
9479.177
These odds are worse than the probability of being struck by
lightning in one’s lifetime, which is 1 in 6250.178 Of course, while
answers to questions in voir dire are not random, the questions are
rarely so simple. Typically, questions are open ended and rarely are
limited to four choices.
Moreover, to trigger a Batson claim, the two prospective jurors
with identical answers would need to be racially distinct, further reducing the odds (unless the one stricken black venireperson was part
of an otherwise all-white jury pool, for example). Therefore, an attorney need only ask a handful of questions to essentially guarantee that
she never fail the “implausibility” test of side-by-side comparisons of
similarly situated jurors of different races.
The low likelihood of being “caught” with an unpersuasive raceneutral explanation is demonstrated by again examining Cook.179 Although the strikes in that case were allowed, McMahon ran the greatest risk of being discredited when he struck two black unemployed
venirepersons without striking the similarly unemployed white juror.180 However, had he included even three other responses in his
packaged explanation of why one juror was struck—e.g., “I struck him
because he is an unemployed gun owner who hasn’t been to church
in the last ten years”—the odds of finding a similarly situated prospective juror plummet to zero. If asked to defend this “packaged” concern, an attorney need only suggest that the combination of these
factors is what makes the person especially problematic—e.g., “His in176
Rather than calculating the probability that any two people in this sample have
identical answers (denoted by P(identical)), it is easier to calculate the complementary
probability that no two people have the same answers (denoted by P(different)). P(identical)
+ P(different) = 1 since those are the only two options in the probability space. Therefore,
P(identical) = 1 – P(different). With sixty people in the jury pool, twelve questions, and four
possible choices per question,

P(identical) = 1 −
177

(412)!
≈ 0.000105501 ≈ 0.0105501%
(4 − 60)!(412)60
12

1
= 9478.58314.
.000105501

178
See Lightning Safety: Medical Aspects of Lightning, NAT’L WEATHER SERVICE, http://
www.lightningsafety.noaa.gov/medical.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (estimating one’s
lifetime as eighty years).
179
952 A.2d 594 (Pa. 2008); see also supra Part I.
180
See Cook, at 609–10 (allowing the strikes because “both of the [striken] venirepersons . . . revealed additional indications of instability other than just unemployment”).

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

1106

unknown

Seq: 32

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-JUL-11

15:47

[Vol. 96:1075

come security, his sawed-off shotgun, and his lack of spiritual centering, collectively, make him too likely to sympathize with the
defendant.” Indeed, McMahon’s habit of providing a long, rambling
list of potential reasons did just that; he bundled enough characteristics into one description such that a similarly situated venireperson of
a different race would never exist.181
In sum, our survey supports the conclusions of previous commentators who have studied the issue.182 Batson, as currently applied, is
unable to prevent the use of race in jury selection because its dictates
are so easily avoided. The three-step framework fashioned by the Supreme Court is simply not up to the task it has been assigned.
IV
SUMMARY

OF

EXISTING REFORM PROPOSALS

Over the years numerous commentators, from Supreme Court
Justices to prominent academics, have questioned the efficacy of Batson.183 Most of the criticism roughly parallels our critique that Batson
has no teeth and allows attorneys to mask racial stereotypes in race- or
gender-neutral rationales and thus succeed in striking jurors based on
race or gender. As explained in Part III, these criticisms continue to
be borne out.
181
For example, McMahon explained that one venireperson he struck was not only
unemployed but also a twenty-four-year-old female student who still lived at home with an
unemployed mother and accordingly raised issues of instability. Id. at 609. See Raphael &
Ungvarsky, supra note 8, at 237 (explaining that in combating a Batson challenge, “the best
strategy for the prosecutor is to offer a combination of . . . rationales”).
182
See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A
CONTINUING LEGACY 4, 6 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/raceandpoverty/
juryselection (follow “PDF: Read the Report” hyperlink) (examining jury selection procedures in eight southern states and summarizing findings as “shocking evidence of [continuing] racial discrimination in jury selection in every state” where “[h]undreds of people of
color called for jury service have been illegally excluded from juries after prosecutors asserted pretextual reasons to justify their removal” that are false, humiliating, demeaning,
and injurious); Shaila Dewan, Blacks Still Being Blocked from Juries in the South, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at A14 (“[T]he practice of excluding blacks and other minorities
from Southern juries remains widespread . . . .”); see also Melilli, supra note 51, at 502
(“With regard to the two legitimate goals of providing litigants with fair and impartial juries and providing potential jurors with fair and nondiscriminatory selection procedures,
[Batson] is entirely counterproductive.”); Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 8, at 234, 236
(arguing that “Batson’s neutral explanation test” can be satisfied too easily); discussion infra
Part IV.
183
See e.g., Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (criticizing
“Batson’s fundamental failings”); Cavise, supra note 8, at 501, 528 (decrying “Batson’s toothless bite” and opining that Purkett v. Elem, 515 U.S. 765 (1995), “marked the final demise of
the Batson doctrine into the rule of useless symbolism”); Page, supra note 8, at 178, 179
(stating that “Batson has engendered an enormous amount of often virulent criticism” and
contending that “[m]ost of the criticism of Batson is justifiable”).

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 33

WIDENING BATSON’S NET

6-JUL-11

15:47

1107

Commentators propose a number of reforms, the most straightforward of which is the abolition of peremptory strikes altogether.184
However, almost a quarter-century since Justice Marshall called for the
abolition of the peremptory challenge in his concurring opinion in
Batson,185 there is little likelihood of this reform being adopted. Even
if the judiciary could find the will to eliminate this venerable facet of
jury selection,186 such drastic action is arguably beyond the power of
the courts. It is one thing to argue that a legislatively authorized and
facially neutral practice (peremptory strikes) is susceptible to abuse
and to invalidate its use in cases where abuse occurs; it is quite another to judicially abolish the practice in all cases regardless of
whether abuse is present.187 The legislators who possess the requisite
authority to act in such a sweeping fashion have shown no inclination
to implement such a change.188
Commentators have also suggested ways to supplement or supplant the Batson framework.189 Among the most notable are (1) guaranteeing a minimum number of jurors who are “racially similar” to
the defendant;190 (2) permitting a new facet of jury selection—the
“peremptory inclusion”—which would allow a party to designate particular jurors who would be immune from peremptory strikes;191 and

184

See Melilli, supra note 51, at 502–03 (“It is time for the peremptory challenge to

R

go.”).
185

476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
187
The peremptory challenge is primarily a creature of statute (or rule). Consequently, courts could not easily eradicate it simply because it is, on occasion, used in an
unconstitutional fashion. See Henning, supra note 48, at 796 (recognizing that “it would be
much harder to justify a complete ban on a well-established trial practice because it has, in
some instances, been used in a discriminatory manner”).
188
See Page, supra note 8, at 246 (recognizing that “the legislatures and courts show
little or no likelihood of eliminating the peremptory challenge”).
189
For a summary of reform proposals, see id. at 245–62. Professor Page’s summary
concludes that “the best solution is to completely eliminate the peremptory challenge.” Id.
at 261; see also Cavise, supra note 8, at 547 (stating that most existing reform proposals “are
highly unlikely either because of the disposition of the Supreme Court or because they are
simply too dissonant with the realities of criminal practice”).
190
See Johnson, supra note 26, at 1698–99 (arguing that to combat racial discrimination among jurors, minority defendants should be provided “three racially similar jurors”
in every case and that courts should “leave open the door for experimentation with alternative remedies”).
191
See Page, supra note 8, at 249 & n.479; Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection:
A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REV. 781, 806–08 (1986) (describing the procedure for a process of affirmative selection); Donna J. Meyer, Note, A New
Peremptory Inclusion to Increase Representativeness and Impartiality in Jury Selection, 45 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 251, 280 (1994) (proposing that defendants be granted “the option of exercising a peremptory inclusion in place of a statutorily authorized peremptory challenge,”
which would seat the selected juror “without contest or removal by the prosecution”).
186

R

R

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

1108

unknown

Seq: 34

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-JUL-11

15:47

[Vol. 96:1075

(3) ratcheting up the severity of the sanctions available for Batson violations, particularly those committed by prosecutors.192
A more modest set of solutions “aimed at improving the detection of pretext” at the third step of the Batson process have also been
proposed.193 As a general matter, retooling the Batson framework is
an attractive approach to improving Batson’s functioning. More
sweeping proposals such as eliminating peremptory challenges, mandating racial jury quotas, and imposing draconian sanctions (such as
dismissal of a criminal prosecution) for Batson violations are unlikely
to resonate beyond the academy and particularly unlikely to resonate
with legislatures who must implement any such reform proposal. Retooling the Batson framework, however, is a solution that courts can
easily implement without legislative assistance and may be willing to
entertain.194 The focus on “improving the detection of pretext,”195
however, is likely a wrong turn. Rather, for the reasons expressed below, a more promising revision of the Batson framework is to abandon
the need for a pretext finding altogether.
V
REFORMING BATSON BY EXPANDING ITS SCOPE AND
NARROWING THE REMEDY FOR ITS VIOLATION
We next focus our analysis on what we perceive to be the two
primary obstacles to a more robust judicial effort to eradicate the use
of race and gender in jury selection: (1) the stark implication of attorney misconduct that now lies at the core of any trial court finding of a
Batson violation and (2) confusion regarding the proper remedy for a
Batson violation in the trial court. Unless these obstacles are addressed, Batson cannot be expected to have anything but the most superficial success in rooting out unconstitutional race- or gender-based
peremptory challenges.

192
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of
Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1117, 1122 (1994) (recommending increased sanctions for prosecutors found to have violated Batson, including dismissing the
case with prejudice and seeking disciplinary action against the individual prosecutor
responsible).
193
See Page, supra note 8, at 259–60; see also Cavise, supra note 8, at 549 (recommending “a reactivation of the judge’s role in rooting out pretext and racist/ sexist/ ethnic
bias”).
194
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I continue to
believe that we should reconsider Batson’s test and the peremptory challenge system as a
whole.”).
195
Page, supra note 8, at 260.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 35

6-JUL-11

WIDENING BATSON’S NET

15:47

1109

A. The Need for an Efficient Remedy for Batson Violations
The more easily eliminated obstacle to robust implementation of
Batson’s antidiscrimination directive is the confusion regarding the
proper remedy for a Batson violation.196 While an appellate finding of
Batson error leads to automatic reversal,197 there is little discussion in
the case law of the proper remedy in the trial court for a Batson violation. The Supreme Court has never endorsed a trial court remedy for
Batson violations, although Batson itself takes note of the two most obvious potential remedies: (1) “discharg[ing] the venire” and (2) “disallow[ing] the discriminatory challenges and resum[ing] selection
with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire.”198
Commentators, however, criticize both of these remedies, and these
criticisms must be answered, or an alternative remedy suggested, in
any serious reform proposal.
1. Objections to the Two Most Obvious Remedies for Batson
Violations
The remedy of dismissing the entire jury panel in response to a
Batson violation is particularly unattractive both administratively and
as a deterrent to Batson violations. The dismissal of the venire impacts
an entire panel of jurors, almost all of whom had no involvement with
the constitutional violation. The dismissal also creates administrative
hardship for the court, jurors, and parties by erasing any progress that
had been made in jury selection prior to the Batson violation.
Dismissing the entire jury panel also arguably has little deterrent
effect because it renders the offending side no worse off than if the
discriminatory strike had never been attempted.199 Indeed, if the offending party is dissatisfied with the venire, the opportunity to select
jurors from a new panel will provide a tactical advantage. In essence,
196
See Cavise, supra note 8, at 543–44 (noting confusion about the proper trial court
remedy for a Batson violation and criticizing possible remedies). Compare Dripps, supra
note 27, at 43 (“Currently, the remedy for a Batson violation at trial is to strike the venire
and start jury selection over . . . .”), and Ogletree, supra note 192, at 1116 (“Under current
practice, the only remedy that courts are prepared to impose when a prosecutor abuses
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory way is to call for a new jury.”), with
Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an Exclusionary Rule Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107, 1139 (2000) (stating that the remedy
for a Batson violation is to “deprive[ ]the offending party of the result that it obtained by
exploiting a defendant’s or a juror’s race: the trial court reseats the juror”).
197
See Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] Batson/Powers
claim is a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review.”); Turner v. Marshall,
121 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There is no harmless error analysis with respect
to Batson claims.”).
198
476 U.S. 79, 100 n.24 (1986).
199
Although, as discussed later, any finding of a Batson violation will have the effect of
stigmatizing the striking attorney.

R
R
R
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the dismissal of the venire punishes judges and jurors more than it
does the misbehaving attorney.200
The second remedy referenced in Batson—reinstating an improperly stricken juror—is also easily criticized as administratively impractical and likely to inject untoward bias into jury deliberations.201 The
administrative-inconvenience criticism is based on the fact that in
many cases the jurors who are the subject of a Batson inquiry—particularly those who were subject to strikes that preceded the strike that
ultimately elicited a Batson objection—will have been dismissed from
the courtroom and replaced on the jury. Reseating these now-absent
jurors will consequently be administratively burdensome, if not practically impossible.
The more substantive criticism of the reseating of an improperly
stricken juror is that, even when a stricken juror is available for reseating, he or she may now harbor prejudice against the striking party.
Indeed, the striking attorney could conceivably resurrect a failed peremptory challenge as a successful challenge for cause, arguing that
the juror is now unlikely to be impartial after being subject to the
attorney’s race- or gender-based strike.
While the two criticisms noted above are certainly valid in particular cases, they do not establish that the remedy of reseating an improperly stricken juror (unlike that of dismissing the entire venire) is
inherently flawed. Rather, these criticisms establish only that procedural safeguards must accompany any reform that relies on reseating
improperly stricken jurors. As discussed below, once such procedural
safeguards are in place, the remedy of reseating improperly stricken
jurors can serve as an elegant and efficient response to a Batson violation and a foundation upon which to base the much-needed reform
of the Batson framework.
2. The Benefits of Reseating Improperly Stricken Jurors
The remedy of reseating improperly stricken jurors has numerous advantages. These advantages are both doctrinal (i.e., a consistency with existing Batson doctrine) and practical. First, the reseating
remedy fits neatly within the themes of existing Batson doctrine. By
disallowing a challenged strike, the trial court provides a narrowly tai200
See Cavise, supra note 8, at 544 (“The dismissal of the entire jury panel as tainted by
discrimination not only costs the court valuable time and resources but also gives the offending attorney a fresh start—hardly a worthy punishment.”); Ogletree, supra note 192, at
1116 (recognizing that dismissing the venire “makes life more difficult for judges who reject fishy pretexts, rather than for [attorneys] who offer them”).
201
See Cavise, supra note 8, at 543–44 (“The reseating of an improperly-excused juror
is not always practical, since most challenged jurors are excused from the venire and permitted to leave the courtroom.” There is added doctrinal difficulty in compelling the criminal defendant to accept jurors he or she had previously stricken . . . .”).

R
R

R
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lored response to a Batson violation. In essence, the judge blocks or
voids the unconstitutional act and returns all parties (including the
subject juror) to the status quo ante.202 This remedy also reflects the
Supreme Court’s emphasis in recent Batson cases on the equal protection rights of the stricken juror.203 If, as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, a race- or gender-based strike implicates the rights of the
stricken juror to serve on the jury, a remedy that returns that juror to
the jury is ideal and certainly preferable to one that results in the juror’s discharge along with the rest of the venire.
Second, the remedy of reseating the juror is practically appealing.
This remedy will be attractive from a judicial perspective because, unlike many remedial suggestions forwarded by academic commentators, it is specifically mentioned in Batson204 and has been regularly
referenced in state and federal appellate decisions.205 Reseating an
improperly stricken juror is also desirable from the standpoint of administrative efficiency: the remedy, when accompanied by appropriate

202

See Holland, supra note 196, at 1139.
See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409–10, 415 (1991) (explaining that a race-based
peremptory challenge violates the right of “[a]n individual juror . . . not to be excluded . . . on account of race” and concluding that “a defendant in a criminal case can
raise the third-party equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prosecution because
of their race”); Henning, supra note 48, at 784 (“Powers broadened the scope of the equal
protection right by shifting the focus from harm to the defendant to harm to potential
jurors removed from the jury for an impermissible reason.”).
204
476 U.S. 79, 100 n.24 (1986).
205
See McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1247 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting that Batson violations are “remediable in any one of a number of ways[:] [c]hallenges found to be
abusive might be disallowed; if this is not feasible because the challenged jurors have already been released, additional jurors might be called to the venire and additional challenges granted to the defendant; or in cases where those remedies are insufficient, the jury
selection might begin anew with a fresh panel”); Jones v. State, 683 A.2d 520, 529–30 (Md.
1996) (surveying jurisdictions and concluding, along with “the majority of the courts that
have considered the issue, . . . that the trial court has the discretion to fashion a remedy for
a Batson violation that addresses and resolves the specific harm caused by that violation,”
including “reseat[ing] the improperly stricken jurors”); State v. Scott, 706 A.2d 1109, 1116
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (finding that “the majority of jurisdictions having addressed the issue leave the decision of determining the appropriate remedy within the
discretion of the trial judge to reseat the wrongfully challenged venireperson” while
“[o]nly a handful of jurisdictions have taken the position that the entire venire must be
discharged”). Two commentators discount the existence of this remedy under current
case law, but it is unclear from their arguments on what this conclusion is based. See Geoffrey Cockrell, Batson Reform: A Lottery System of Affirmative Selection, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 351, 370 & n.119 (1997) (citing Ogletree, supra note 192, for the
proposition that “[c]urrently, the only remedy for a Batson violation is to call for a new
jury”); Ogletree, supra note 192, at 1116 (stating that “[u]nder current practice, the only
remedy that courts are prepared to impose when a prosecutor abuses peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory way is to call for a new jury” but including no citations).
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procedural safeguards (discussed below), is easily implemented and
minimally disruptive to the jury selection process.206
3. A Procedure for Reseating Improperly Stricken Jurors
Given the comparative attractiveness of the simple remedy of
reseating an improperly stricken juror, it is incumbent on the courts
to adopt procedures that address the common criticisms of that remedy. The trial courts undoubtedly have authority to craft such procedures given the vast discretion they possess in this context.207
Although there are, no doubt, numerous ways to accomplish this goal,
we propose two simple procedural safeguards by way of example that
would permit reseating of an improperly challenged juror as a remedy
for a Batson violation.
First, and most obviously, trial courts must refrain from excusing
jurors who have been the subject of a peremptory challenge. Instead
of dismissing jurors immediately after they are stricken, the trial court
should require stricken jurors to remain in the courtroom until the
final jury is empanelled. Admittedly, one negative consequence of
this proposal is that it would slightly inconvenience properly stricken
jurors who will be required to remain in the courtroom somewhat
longer than under previous practice prior to being discharged.
Second, the trial court must ensure that jurors do not become
aware that they have been the subject of a peremptory strike. Ensuring jurors’ unawareness of the parties’ strikes can be accomplished in
a variety of ways, including by requiring counsel to note peremptory
strikes on a piece of paper that is passed to the judge rather than
announcing challenges orally in open court. Upon receipt of the written strikes, the trial court would take no immediate action but simply
note the jurors who had been provisionally stricken. (Counsel would
have to keep track of the potential jurors who had been subject to
strikes in order to identify the twelve jurors, plus alternates, who will,
absent further strikes or a Batson challenge, make up the jury.) Later,
when counsel challenges a strike and that strike is disallowed, the juror will be available for reseating without engendering any administrative inefficiency or bias-related juror objections.
The above-described procedure would allow a party to raise—and
the trial court to rule on—a Batson motion without the subject jurors
206
Cf. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“Batson
permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process.”).
207
See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(“Because the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial
judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have
been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire.” (emphasis omitted)).
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ever realizing that they have been stricken. Further, because the jurors would not be dismissed until a final jury is selected, each provisionally stricken juror remains available for reinstatement if the court
invalidates a peremptory challenge under Batson. Consequently, this
voir dire procedure (or an analogous procedure) would eliminate any
administrative or objectivity-based objection to the remedy of reseating an improperly stricken juror, allowing for a narrowly tailored remedy for a Batson violation that could be easily (and thus more
willingly) implemented by trial courts.
B. Successful Batson Challenges Require Drastic Findings of
Attorney Misconduct
Providing a simple, practical remedy for Batson violations is a necessary, but not sufficient, step toward the realization of Batson’s stated
goal of eliminating race and gender bias in jury selection. The primary obstacle to successful Batson challenges is not the absence of a
remedy but rather the drastic finding required before any court may
deem the exercise of a peremptory strike unconstitutional. As discussed below, so long as a personally and professionally damning finding of attorney misconduct remains a prerequisite to awarding relief
under Batson, trial courts will be understandably reluctant to find Batson violations.
Under current Batson doctrine, the trial court cannot reject a peremptory challenge unless it makes a finding of attorney misconduct
that has at least two facets, either of which would give any reasonable
trial judge pause. First, the judge must make a factual finding that the
race- or gender-neutral explanation proffered by the striking attorney
at Batson’s second step is not, in fact, the reason for the strike but is
instead “pretextual.”208 In other words, the court must find that the
attorney has made a misrepresentation to the court of a material
fact—a serious breach of the attorney’s ethical duty of candor.209 Sec208

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam).
Misrepresenting a material fact to a court is a violation of the ethical standards
governing attorneys in every American jurisdiction. See Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception
and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 12–14 & n.14 (1997) (cataloguing operative ethics rules and noting that “there are universally applicable rules banning the making
of false statements or misrepresentations to a court”); Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned
Shaw—Requiring the Government to Treat Citizens as Individuals When It Cannot, 49 LOY. L.
REV. 133, 165 (2003) (“In order to grant a Batson challenge against an attorney, the judge
must call him a liar, a judicial determination that raises legal ethics considerations.”).
There is, theoretically speaking, a subset of pretext findings that would not amount to
an accusation of intentional misconduct. See infra Part V.C. In arguing against the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for Batson violations, for example, Professor Charlow notes
that a judge could conclude that the attorney’s proffered justification is a pretext, but an
“unintentional falsehood” based on the attorneys having “lied to themselves” about the
true motivation for the strike. See Charlow, supra, at 23, 39 (referencing possibility that the
striker “acted with an unconscious discriminatory intent”). In such cases, the attorney’s
209
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ond and relatedly, the judge must find that the attorney exercised a
peremptory challenge based on race or gender and accordingly violated the juror’s constitutional right to equal protection under the
law.210 Indeed, considered together, a trial court ruling in favor of a
Batson movant constitutes a judicial determination that an attorney, in
open court, engaged in a misrepresentation of a material fact to obscure a violation of the law—an action that, in other contexts, could
warrant criminal prosecution.211
Given the implications of the findings required to establish a Batson violation, it is understandable that in all but the most extreme
cases, trial courts will err on the side of crediting the reason proffered
for a strike.212 Often judges are themselves former prosecutors or delevel of culpability is certainly lowered. Nevertheless, the finding of a Batson violation is
still quite damning, and one could legitimately question whether an attorney beset by such
severe unconscious bias should be permitted to engage in jury selection. In any event, a
judge’s ability to discern an attorney’s true motivation when that motivation is unknown
even to the attorney is highly questionable, particularly because the judge’s finding will be
based almost solely on the attorney’s demeanor. Consequently, instances of such findings,
while theoretically conceivable, are undoubtedly rare.
210
See Charlow, supra note 209, at 17, 20 (noting that “[i]n the vast majority of
cases, . . . a finding of pretext will demonstrate [the requisite discriminatory] intent” because “the[ ] two determinations are often integrally intertwined”); Page, supra note 8, at
177–78 (recognizing that “to refuse to accept a peremptory challenge is the equivalent of
calling the attorney a liar, and maybe racist or sexist as well” such that “[a] judge is likely to
be reluctant to stigmatize a lawyer in this way”); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,
485 (2008) (“The prosecution’s proffer of this pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to
an inference of discriminatory intent.”). Admittedly, there are possible, but unlikely, scenarios where a finding of pretext does not lead to a conclusion that the attorney engaged
in purposeful discrimination. For example, the attorney may offer a pretext to cover up a
potentially embarrassing, but not unconstitutional, explanation for a strike (e.g., a potential juror reminds the attorney of an ex-spouse).
211
Because the ethical implications of a Batson violation are so severe, commentators
have suggested that courts could enhance the sanctions for Batson violations to include
“[a] contempt citation,” “removal from the courtroom,” “suspension,” and “referral to the
appropriate disciplinary bodies in every jurisdiction where the [attorney] is admitted to
practice.” Ogletree, supra note 192, at 1122.
212
See José Felipé Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the
Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 374, 377 (1998) (recognizing that
Batson “requires the judge to ask an officer of the court whether he has violated his obligation to be candid with the court,” which is “tantamount to an accusation of dishonesty,”
and that trial courts “have little incentive to use it against lawyers who regularly practice
before them”); Cavise, supra note 8, at 531 (noting that it is “asking a lot” of the trial court
to “doubt the integrity of an attorney who has, in most cases, been in that trial courtroom
before and who is perhaps well-known to the trial judge”); Henning, supra note 48, at 787
(noting that a finding that a prosecutor has intentionally violated a juror’s constitutional
rights is “one that no judge wants to reach lightly” and that “trial courts have a hard time
finding the prosecutor’s proffered explanation a subterfuge for purposeful discrimination”); William E. Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Judicial Toleration of Racial Bias in the Minnesota Justice System, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 235, 268 (2002) (“The trial judge’s task is
complicated by the reality that any finding of intentional discrimination may have serious
ethical implications for the prosecutor. It might be appropriate for judges to give prosecutors the benefit of the doubt before making any finding that a prosecutor’s stated reason is
a pretext and the prosecutor has in fact engaged in impermissible racial discrimination.”);
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fense attorneys who, consequently, are likely to be part of the same
professional and social networks as the attorneys whose strikes they
evaluate.213 A judge who might have few qualms about ruling against
the prosecution or defense may be hesitant to make the findings of
personal misconduct against prosecutors or defense attorneys (who
are also more often than not repeat players in the judge’s courtroom)
called for under Batson.214 As a consequence, a trial judge is likely to
acquiesce in Batson violations that it might prevent if a less drastic
mechanism were available.
It is interesting to note that the above criticism (or a response to
it) does not appear in the Supreme Court’s extensive Batson jurisprudence. One potential explanation for this omission is that, as a general matter, the Justices have little or no experience as trial judges.215
Indeed, the sole exception on the Court prior to Justice Sotomayor’s
appointment was Justice Souter, who suggested that the Batson framework should be revisited.216 Viewed from the Supreme Court’s perspective, there likely does not appear to be anything personal about
finding a Batson violation; the Court’s decisions are far removed from
the face-to-face findings required of a trial court. For example, in
Miller-El v. Dretke, the Supreme Court held that a Dallas County prosecutor’s reasons for a peremptory strike exercised twenty years earlier
were pretextual.217 Similarly, in Snyder v. Louisiana, the Court found
that a state prosecutor in Louisiana offered a pretextual justification
in exercising a strike twelve years before.218 It is, of course, one thing
for a Supreme Court Justice to determine that an unknown local prosecutor at a distant time in the past offered a pretextual reason for a
strike; it is quite another to make the same finding face-to-face with a
Page, supra note 8, at 177–78 (recognizing that a finding of pretext is “likely to color the
rest of the trial” as well as “other trials in jurisdictions where lawyers appear frequently
before the same judges”); Tetlow, supra note 209, at 165 (explaining that judges are unlikely to reject proffered justifications when they are required “to decide (under a pretext
analysis) that the lawyer has lied to them” because “[r]egardless of whether sanctions attach, judges must find it unpleasant to do so, particularly to repeat players”).
213
See Charlow, supra note 209, at 60 (warning against imposing harsher sanctions for
Batson violations because “Batson findings are made by trial judges, who often know the
attorneys practicing before them” and are “especially apt to know prosecutors, who appear
regularly before local courts”).
214
See id.
215
See SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40802, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL EDUCATION,
1789–2009, at 32 (2010) (“Only one [Justice at the time of writing] served on a trial court
at the state or federal level.”).
216
See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (bemoaning
“Batson’s fundamental failings”); David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1741 (2007) (noting that on the Court at that time, only
Justice Souter had experience as a trial court judge).
217
See 545 U.S. 231, 235–36, 240, 266 (2005).
218
See 552 U.S. 472, 475–76 (2008).

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

1116

unknown

Seq: 42

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-JUL-11

15:47

[Vol. 96:1075

legal peer or social acquaintance immediately following the voicing of
the pretext.
C. Trial Courts Have Little Information from Which to
Determine Attorney Intent
A trial court’s natural reluctance to make findings that, if taken
seriously, will forever mar the professional reputation of the subject
attorney dovetails with the difficulty inherent in resolving whether
such findings are truly warranted. Even if a trial court is inclined to
make the severe findings required under Batson, the court will have
little information upon which to ground those findings. In particular,
the trial court has almost no evidence from which to discern a striking
attorney’s intent, which is the dispositive question under Batson.219
In part, the trial court’s lack of information is a byproduct of the
fact that the minihearing contemplated by the Batson three-step process is remarkably unadorned with procedure.220 In fact, the hearing
may take only a matter of seconds, with (1) a Batson motion, (2) a
reason proffered by the striking attorney, and (3) the trial court’s ruling all occurring in rapid succession. In most cases there will be little
argument and no evidence presented during this brief colloquy.221
Contrast this with the evidence that will be brought to bear on
the analogous question of whether an employer has offered a pretextual reason for an unlawful, adverse employment decision. For example, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,222 the Supreme Court
considered an employer’s liability for racial discrimination when it refused to rehire a black applicant ostensibly because of his participation in an unlawful job action.223 The Court noted that the dispositive
question was whether this justification was a pretext and that that
question could be answered by: (1) “evidence that white employees
involved in acts against [the employer] of comparable seriousness to
the ‘stall-in’ were nevertheless retained or rehired”; (2) “the [employer’s] treatment of [the applicant] during his prior term of employment;” (3) the employer’s “reaction, if any, to [the applicant’s]
legitimate civil rights activities”; and (4) the employer’s “general pol219
Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination
in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 322 (2007) (“Batson challenges occur in a virtual evidentiary vacuum—there is extremely little evidence available even in a full-blown Batson
hearing to shed much light on the question of whether an explanation is credible.”).
220
See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (noting that “[t]here will seldom
be much evidence bearing on” the question of whether an attorney exercised a discriminatory strike and that “the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who
exercises the challenge” (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion))).
221
See id.
222
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
223
See id. at 794–95, 807.
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icy and practice with respect to minority employment,” including “statistics as to [the employer’s] employment policy and practice.”224 The
Court stated that the applicant “must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up for a racially
discriminatory decision.”225
In contrast, in resolving the issue as to whether a reason proffered under Batson is pretextual, the Court has blandly acknowledged
that “[t]here will seldom be much evidence bearing on [the] issue.”226
The trial court will have before it some rough numbers as to the racial
makeup of the venire, its observations of the strikes to the point of the
challenge, and the race- or gender-neutral reasons offered for the disputed challenges. It is unlikely that this information will provide any
definitive answer to the Batson inquiry,227 and, accordingly, the ultimate decision will turn, and is intended to turn, on the trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of the striking attorney, something that it
must divine largely from the attorney’s demeanor.228
Under current Batson doctrine, then, the trial court is expected to
function as something of a human lie detector in evaluating whether
224

Id. at 804–05.
Id. at 805.
226
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003) (quoting Hernandez v. New York,
500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion); cf. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927
(1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasizing that the Batson inquiry “differs decisively from the employment context, where the court can examine an
employer’s treatment of similarly situated applicants to test an employer’s assertion that an
Afro–American candidate would not have been hired absent a discriminatory motive”).
227
The Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence already establishes a high hurdle for a plaintiff seeking to prove discriminatory purpose behind a facially neutral government decision with a disproportionate racial impact: she must prove that the decision
maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (elaborating on the requirement of discriminatory purpose announced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248–50 (1976), which upheld a test
administered to job applicants despite its discriminatory effect and lack of correlation to
job performance). The plaintiff can jump this hurdle, however, by proving purpose
through various means, including aggregate data of statistical disparities by the state actor,
a historical background revealing evidence of racial invidiousness, and departures from
normal procedures or prior policymaking standards. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (announcing that an analysis of
discriminatory purpose is “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available”). But the Batson test raises the hurdle even higher by requiring an attorney to demonstrate this discriminatory purpose in a matter of minutes—without the weeks of research, depositions, interrogatories, and other discovery that might
allow a challenger to better support her Equal Protection Clause claim. In other words,
what the Court expects a Batson claimant to prove is similar to what it expected the ejected
applicants in Washington to prove, except that the entire pretrial and trial process could
take less than a minute without any opportunity to research the law, interrogate the state
actor, or accumulate useful evidence.
228
See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (noting that determinations
of credibility and demeanor typically lie within the province of the trial judge).
225
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an Equal Protection violation has occurred.229 There is little empirical evidence, however, that trial courts are particularly adept at this
task, and the evidence that exists calls any such assumption into question.230 In light of the accusation of misconduct implied by a Batson
challenge, demeanor may, in fact, be a less reliable indicator than has
been shown in experimental studies. Even when acting in good faith,
an attorney will likely become unusually nervous and agitated when
accused of violating Batson, indicia that will likely interfere with the
trial court’s intuitive ability to perceive mendacity.231
Given the bare-bones procedure and resulting absence of concrete evidence of intent, the trial court will often be left with a great
deal of uncertainty about the propriety of a finding of pretext and
purposeful discrimination. In essence, the entire Batson inquiry
comes down to the trial judge’s gut feeling as to the credibility of the
striking attorney. As one commentator has stated, “Courts are guessing at the content of the striking attorney’s thoughts, something
which they simply cannot know and about which there will be precious little evidence.”232 It is unrealistic in this context to expect trial
courts to “guess” in favor of a Batson movant. Indeed, it would generally be legally improper to do so, as the Supreme Court has emphasized that any difficulty in establishing discriminatory intent will be
held against the Batson movant who has “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation.”233 Yet, “guessing” is precisely
what the Court requires of trial courts before they are permitted to
find a Batson violation.
229
See Charlow, supra note 209, at 60 (highlighting “the absence of the kinds of procedural protections, such as heightened burdens of proof, that accompany more formal determinations of mental state”).
230
See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 578, 707 &
nn.606–07 (1997) (explaining that “[t]here is little evidence that regular people do much
better than chance at separating truth from lies” and describing studies in which “experimental subjects rarely perform much better than chance at distinguishing truth from falsehood”); Dan Simon, The Limited Disagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143,
174–80 (2011) (summarizing empirical evidence regarding ability to detect deceit).
231
The Supreme Court has rejected inquiries into subjective intent in other contexts.
See Henning, supra note 48, at 793 (stating that the Batson doctrine’s emphasis on the
subjective intent of the prosecutor “sticks out like the proverbial sore thumb in the area of
prosecutorial misconduct” because “[i]n other contexts, the Supreme Court has adopted
tests that largely make judicial inquiry into prosecutorial motives irrelevant”); cf. Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (explaining in Fourth Amendment context that
previous cases “foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic
stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved” and noting that
“the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is
the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment”).
232
Charlow, supra note 209, at 47.
233
See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (“[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.”).
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Further, even if one accepts the unproven assumption that trial
courts have an innate capacity to decipher attorney demeanor, the
exceedingly grey area of modern race and gender bias will sorely test
this capacity. Largely gone are the days when the Supreme Court can
point to such smoking-gun evidence of purposeful discrimination as
the training video discussed in the introduction to this Article, or “the
general policy of the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office to exclude black venire members from juries.”234 Official policies of discrimination are fortunately a relic of a bygone era, replaced with
modern concepts such as unconscious bias and cognitive shortcuts
based on racial stereotypes.235
“[S]ometimes, no one, not even the lawyer herself, can be certain
whether a decision to exercise a peremptory challenge rests upon an
impermissible racial, religious, gender-based, or ethnic stereotype.”236
In fact, it is unlikely that a peremptory challenge is ever exercised
based on a single discrete factor such as race or gender. Every juror
brings a broad array of characteristics to the jury selection process,
some of which will appeal to the prosecution and others to the defense. When, as is virtually always the case, a strike is motivated by a
complex intuition-based algorithm that includes the weighing of perceived positive and negative factors—only one of which is race or gender—it is virtually impossible, even with perfect information, to
discern whether an attorney’s true motivation was race or gender.237
234
See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253 (2005) (commenting on the policy in
effect in 1988).
235
See, e.g., Travis L. Dixon & Keith B. Maddox, Skin Tone, Crime News, and Social Reality
Judgments: Priming the Stereotype of the Dark and Dangerous Black Criminal, 35 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1555, 1555 (2005) (concluding that participants who watched a crime-related
newscast tended to remember the perpetrator more often when he was a dark-skinned
black man); Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (“[S]tereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination are enduring human phenomena.”); Audrey J. Lee, Note,
Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
481, 482 (2005) (“A burgeoning body of social science literature has empirically demonstrated the existence and prevalence of unconscious bias in today’s society.”); cf. Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009) (recognizing “[t]he difficulties of
inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one” in determining whether a judge should have recused himself for conflict of interest and emphasizing
that “[i]n lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry, or on appellate review of the
judge’s determination respecting actual bias, the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias”).
236
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Brian J. Serr &
Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1988) (noting that racism “in contemporary America[ is] subtle and often unconscious”).
237
See Collins, 546 U.S. at 343 (Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing that “the exercise
of a peremptory challenge can rest upon instinct not reason” and asking “[i]nsofar as
Batson asks prosecutors to explain the unexplainable, how can it succeed?”). The Supreme
Court has not explained how to apply Batson in circumstances where race plays some role
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In sum, given the difficulty of determining the true reason for a
strike and the paucity of information available, a trial court with mere
human powers of cognition—and any measure of humility—will hesitate to make the stark findings of attorney misconduct necessary to
declare a Batson violation.238 Thus, if existing doctrine remains unchanged, it should come as no surprise that (as suggested by our survey) Batson will continue to fail to weed out reliance on race and
gender in jury selection.
D. Revising the Step-Three Finding
As long as Batson and its progeny fail to empower trial courts to
take remedial action absent a finding of pretext, those courts will be
understandably reluctant to uncover Batson violations. Consequently,
many strikes that appear unsavory will survive a Batson objection because the alternative—rejecting the strike—is even more unpalatable.
The solution to this dilemma is to decouple Batson violations
from any finding regarding the striking attorney’s subjective intent.
Instead, basing Batson findings on the alternate grounds discussed below and narrowing the Batson remedy to the mere reseating of a juror
(as discussed in Part V.A) will enable a robust implementation of Batson and carve out the necessary breathing space for the Equal Protection rights at issue to thrive.
in a strike but is not necessarily the determinative factor. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S.
472, 485 (2008) (noting that “[i]n other circumstances, we have held that, once it is shown
that a discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in an action taken by a
state actor, the burden shifts to the party defending the action to show that this factor was
not determinative,” but stating that “[w]e have not previously applied this rule in a Batson
case, and we need not decide here whether that standard governs in this context”). The
federal appeals courts split on the question; some adopt a “mixed motive” analysis and
others following the “substantial motivating factor” approach. See, e.g., Cook v. Lamarque,
593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2010) (summarizing the split and rejecting the “mixed-motives
analysis” to adopt the rule that a Batson challenge should be granted whenever race was a
substantial motivating factor in a strike).
238
See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (“All
courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both
sensitive and difficult. . . . There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s
mental processes.”); Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1566
(11th Cir. 1995) (recognizing “the inherent difficulty of proving discriminatory intent”);
Thomas v. Moore, 866 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The decision to exercise a peremptory challenge, in contrast to a challenge for cause, is subjective; and, often, the reasons
behind that decision cannot be easily articulated.”); Covey, supra note 219, at 322–23 (explaining that “courts have an inherent disincentive to uphold Batson challenges” because
of the difficulty in determining whether an attorney’s proffered justification “is a flat-out
lie,” a finding that “extends beyond a mere procedural ruling and implicates the attorney
in ethical misconduct”); cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 238 (recognizing “the practical
difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature, and choices
subject to myriad legitimate influences, whatever the race of the individuals on the panel
from which jurors are selected”).
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To create this breathing space, we propose that a third alternative
be added to the trial court’s menu of options at step three of the Batson process. First, as always, the trial court can conclude that the attorney’s justification is credible and race- or gender-neutral and
accordingly (subject to the third option discussed below) permit the
strike. Second, the trial court can, as under current doctrine, deem
the proffered justification a pretext for discrimination and reject the
strike, exposing the striking attorney to, inter alia, potential ethics
charges. Third, as a new addition to the doctrinal menu, the trial
court could disallow the peremptory challenge based on a finding that
falls somewhere between these first two options. More specifically, a
trial court could invalidate a peremptory challenge whenever the attorney’s proffered justification, even if credited, is insufficient to rebut
the prima facie case of discrimination established at Batson’s first step.
Thus, contrary to current doctrine, the burden would shift to the striking party—the party who knows the most about the motivations for
the challenged strike—not just to articulate a race-neutral reason at
step two of the Batson inquiry but to actually rebut in some meaningful
way the allegation that race (or gender) motivated the challenged
strike.239 Failure to do so—a failure to dispel the appearance of discrimination—would result in the court disallowing the strike.
Our proposal instills step one of the Batson process with the gravity it is due. Recall that for a Batson objection to survive the first step
of the Batson process, the trial court must find “a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination”240 such that there is “evidence sufficient to
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has
occurred.”241 Thus, a step-one finding of a prima facie case represents a common sense judgment that race or gender appears to motivate a party’s strike. Such a circumstance is cause for great concern.
It is because of this concern that the Supreme Court, after years of
equivocation, allowed trial judges to disturb the peremptory nature of
the “peremptory” challenge by demanding an explanation for the
strike.242 The Court intended this inquiry—step two of the existing
Batson rubric—to dispel the appearance of discriminatory intent by
opening a window into the otherwise hidden thought process of the
striking attorney, perhaps revealing a valid, nonracial reason for the
strike. If this window instead reveals a nonracial reason that is trivial,
239
Cf. Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasizing “the purely subjective nature of peremptory challenges”).
240
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93–94 (1986).
241
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005).
242
Cf. Serr & Maney, supra note 236, at 41 (emphasizing that Batson represents a balance of competing interests—the prevention of racial discrimination and the “historical
role of the peremptory challenge”—and that “[t]he prima facie case requirement is exactly
that aspect of Batson which protects the peremptory nature of the challenge”).
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unsupported by the record, or strongly correlated with race, it does
not accomplish its purpose of dispelling the inference of race discrimination. Even if subjectively believed by striking attorneys, race-correlated, nonsensical, or unsupported rationales for an apparent pattern
of discriminatory strikes will do little to dispel the appearance of discriminatory intent established at step one of the Batson process.243 In
short, the fact that a reason offered is nonpretextual fails to resolve
the constitutional inquiry, even if the reason is credited. The real
question is whether there has been an adequate response to the allegation of discriminatory jury selection. Our proposal allows that question to be answered; current Batson doctrine obscures the answer
behind an amorphous and unrealistic credibility determination.
In evaluating a Batson objection under this proposal, as under
current practice, the court will not be required to look at only the
particular strike that elicited a Batson objection but can also consider
relevant prior strikes.244 Reviewing a Batson objection in the context
of all previous strikes will allow the trial judge to narrowly tailor a Batson remedy by disallowing only those strikes for which the striking attorney offers the flimsiest rationales. Reasons like facial hair and eye
rolling will likely be assigned low significance, and more significant
reasons, such as a hostile exchange between attorney and juror in voir
dire or disputed for-cause rulings by the trial court, will be assigned
high significance.245 Further, the number of questionable strikes will
243
Cf. id. at 61 (emphasizing in early Batson commentary that in ruling on a Batson
objection, “a trial court should not disregard the evidence on which it based its initial
finding that the defendant established a prima facie case”).
244
See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (recognizing that a trial court
must consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity,” including strikes of other jurors (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 239 (2005))).
245
Other commentators have suggested altering the Batson doctrine in analogous
ways. See Cavise, supra note 8, at 549–50 (suggesting that judges require that a proffered
justification “makes sense”); Henning, supra note 48, at 794–95 (suggesting that one
method of improving Batson would be “to lower the standard by which the trial court can
remove a juror for cause” by allowing the courts to “combine the prima facie requirement
of Batson with the challenge for cause, requiring the attorney who appears to be striking
jurors in a discriminatory manner to justify the peremptory challenges by something more
than just a neutral explanation”); Nelson, supra note 8, at 1703 (arguing that a Batson
challenge should be upheld “when the evidence fits a hypothesis of racial discrimination . . . better than the race neutral reason offered”); Page, supra note 8, at 260–61 (recognizing the benefits of an “objective” standard for Batson violations and suggesting that trial
courts could find that although an attorney believed she “acted in good faith” she would
not have exercised the peremptory challenge “but for the potential juror’s race or gender”
and is thus unconstitutional); Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 8, at 269 (contending that
judges should reject explanations for strikes that are based on “unverifiable, subjective
judgments”); Tetlow, supra note 209, at 165 (arguing that under a Sixth Amendment analysis, the inquiry could be not whether a pretext has been offered but whether a proffered
justification is “sufficient to justify skewing the cross-section of the jury”). A judge appears
to have implemented something like our proposal in a recent case. See Jennifer Emily,
Black Juror Seated: Judge Orders Change After All-White Panel Picked in Murder Case, DALL. MORN-
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play a central role in the analysis. An attorney may succeed in striking
one or two members of a certain race or gender for relatively insubstantial reasons, but as the number increases—particularly in relation
to the number of remaining jurors of the targeted race or gender—
the substantiality of the proffered justification would need to increase
accordingly to offset the increased appearance of discrimination.
Under our proposal, the trial court will not be required to make a
determination as to the striking attorney’s subjective intent or credibility in order to find a Batson violation. The trial court may simply
assume that the striking attorney has offered a justification in good
faith; subjective good faith has no significance to the proposed inquiry. Of course, should the trial court determine that an attorney is
not being candid with the court, it has inherent power to take appropriate action, such as rejection of the strike or referral to the appropriate disciplinary authority. Much more commonly, however, the
court will understandably decline to make such a drastic finding, and
this reluctance will no longer hamstring the Batson inquiry.246
An example illustrates how the trial courts could evaluate a challenge under this proposal. A prosecutor strikes five black jurors, and
then, when the fifth strike draws a Batson objection and the court finds
a prima facie case, the prosecutor offers five rationales of varying plausibility for each of the strikes. Rather than attempt to divine the attorney’s true motivation for the strikes from the paltry information that
will become available during a Batson hearing, the trial court instead
evaluates the strikes as a whole, along with the justifications offered, to
determine the degree to which there appears to be a racial component in the overall pattern of strikes. If this analysis reveals a significant appearance of discrimination, the trial court should proceed to
evaluate whether, with respect to each of the strikes, the proponent
has rebutted this prima facie case of discrimination. Depending on
the rationales the proponent has offered, the court might disallow
only one of the strikes or perhaps all of them. Importantly, the trial
court can invalidate strikes without ever making a finding that the
striking attorney lied or engaged in purposeful race or gender discrimination. Rather, with the principles of Batson as a guide for each
particular strike, the trial court would merely find that the strike’s proponent failed to rebut the appearance of discrimination established
by the Batson movant in establishing a prima facie case.

ING NEWS, July 31, 2009, LexisNexis Academic (reporting a trial judge’s ruling that, although “he did not think that prosecutors gave false reasons for the dismissal” of a black
juror, “he was troubled by an all-white jury judging” the case and therefore ordered the
stricken potential juror be seated on the jury).
246
See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
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It is likely, and indeed intended, that this proposal will result in a
greater number of findings of Batson violations. Common sense dictates that giving trial judges a mechanism for finding Batson violations
that neither relies on a finding of misconduct nor requires the court
to divine the attorney’s subjective intent will result in the “discovery”
of an increased number of Batson violations. Indeed, experimental
research in other contexts suggests that simply by virtue of giving the
trial courts a third “compromise” choice, the courts will select that
choice in a greater number of cases.247
The short-term increase in findings of Batson violations should be
somewhat palatable to attorneys because the specter of attorney misconduct is largely removed from such findings and the remedy imposed (the rejection of a strike) is relatively minor. A juror subject to
a disallowed peremptory challenge is, after all, qualified to serve on
the jury, and thus there is no constitutional basis for the peremptory
challenge.248 All that is lost when the trial court disallows a peremptory challenge is a speculative tactical advantage—an advantage that
similar constraints placed on one’s opponent largely cancels out.
In addition, as distinct from proposals to abolish peremptory
challenges, under this proposal the striking party is deprived only of
the peremptory challenges for which the least persuasive rationales
are offered. The vast majority of peremptory strikes will survive. Indeed, many strikes will go unchallenged. In addition, even when a
movant invokes Batson, the trial court may still reject the motion or
may void only a portion of the strikes at issue. Where the proponent
has proffered a substantial, permissible reason for a strike, such as
where the attorney and the prospective juror clashed during voir dire
or the attorney believes that trial court’s refusal of a for-cause challenge was erroneous, the peremptory challenge will survive even if the
court disallows other peremptory challenges. More significantly, the
proposal outlined above will remediate numerous instances of race-

247
This is because judges who might be unwilling to choose the drastic finding now
required to support a Batson violation could be more comfortable choosing what appears
to be a middle ground position—one that still protects the constitutional rights of the
excluded jurors. See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 287, 288, 303 (1996) (describing “compromise effects” and contending that
providing a third “compromise” choice to judges and jurors is likely to influence them to
choose the perceived compromise choice).
248
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.7 (1994) (“Although peremptory challenges are valuable tools in jury trials, they ‘are not constitutionally protected
fundamental rights; rather they are but one state-created means to the constitutional end
of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’” (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57
(1992))); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (“This Court repeatedly has
stated that the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.”).
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and gender-influenced selection that the current Batson regime
overlooks.
Decreasing the focus on the attorney’s subjective intent and emphasizing instead whether a proffered justification serves to rebut a
prima facie case also allows trial courts to sidestep one of the most
unpleasant aspects of current Batson practice—judicial inquiry into jurors’ race. As the dissenters in Batson emphasized, a “painful paradox” of Batson is that it “interject[s] racial matters back into the jury
selection process” as “[p]rosecutors and defense attorneys alike will
build records in support of their claims that peremptory challenges
have been exercised in a racially discriminatory fashion.”249 Establishing such a record can often entail “asking jurors to state their racial
background and national origin for the record, despite the fact that
‘such questions may be offensive to some jurors and thus are not ordinarily asked on voir dire.’”250 By allowing the trial judge to focus objectively on whether the prima facie case of discrimination has been
dispelled, our proposal minimizes the need for inquiry into the race
of the jurors. The only thing the trial court must evaluate is the appearance of discrimination—something the court should generally be
able to perceive without reference to the subjective beliefs of the striking attorney or the actual race (or gender) of the jurors.
E. The Current Proposal Under Existing Law
The proposed alteration of the Batson framework, while admittedly a change from current doctrine, is not without doctrinal support. This is because the Supreme Court’s case law is torn by
conflicting themes. For example, there exists support in the Court’s
case law for a requirement that the justification for a strike offered at
step two must, in fact, rebut the prima facie case. Batson itself references the prosecutor’s need to “rebut the defendant’s prima facie case
of discrimination.”251 It stands to reason that a paltry or fanciful ex249

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 129 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 129–30; see also People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 180 (Cal. 1985) (“Finally, it is
unnecessary to establish the true racial identity of the challenged jurors; discrimination is
more often based on appearances than verified racial descent, and a showing that the
prosecution was systematically excusing persons who appear to be [b]lack would establish a
prima facie case . . . .”). The Batson framework presumes that the race of the prospective
jurors will be apparent, but in fact, the parties may dispute these facts and create the need
for judicial inquiry. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, No. 04-9579, 2008 WL 2406496, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. June 16, 2008) (noting that after “[t]he prosecutor disputed defense counsel’s
characterization of the races of the excluded jurors,” a “wide-ranging discussion of the
various ethnicities of the excluded jurors ensued” with one of the jurors “later inform[ing]
the court that she was not Hispanic, but from Guam”).
251
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Other courts have adopted the rhetorical formulation that a
strike’s proponent must rebut the prima facie case. See, e.g., Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340
F.3d 178, 184–85 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that the question upon the articulation of a raceneutral explanation is did “the party defending the challenges rebut the prima facie case
250

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\96-5\CRN501.txt

1126

unknown

Seq: 52

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-JUL-11

15:47

[Vol. 96:1075

planation of a peremptory challenge, while easily satisfying the raceneutrality criterion of Purkett v. Elem,252 will nevertheless fail to “rebut”
the allegation of discrimination.
Batson also suggested that an acceptable justification for a challenged strike would be one that is “clear and reasonably specific,”
race-neutral, and “related to the particular case to be tried.”253 Under this
standard, reasons such as hair color or demeanor arguably come up
short absent some bearing on the facts of a particular case. The Court
in Elem later retreated from the language quoted above, ruling that
honest race neutrality was all that was required, regardless of whether
the reason given could be tied to the specific case to be tried.254 Nevertheless, the existence in Batson of language supporting the current
proposal would make it easier for the courts to reverse course.
As the preceding discussion suggests, Elem is the largest doctrinal
obstacle to our proposal. In that decision, the Court emphasized that
the burden of persuasion never shifts from the party challenging a
strike and that ultimate resolution of a Batson challenge turns not on
the persuasiveness of the justification offered for a strike but on “an
assessment of credibility.”255 While lower courts have generally interpreted these statements to constitute a repudiation of any requirement that a race- or gender-neutral justification be both offered in
good faith and at least marginally persuasive, even Elem offers mixed
signals on this point.256 The Elem opinion emphasizes that while nothing more than good faith race neutrality is required, it states that “the
by tendering a race-neutral explanation for the strikes?” (emphasis omitted)); Aki-Khuam
v. Davis, 339 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that at step three, “the trial court
must determine whether the parties have satisfied their respective burdens of proving or
rebutting purposeful racial discrimination”); Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1318 (11th Cir.
2003) (concluding that defendant was “denied equal protection of the law by the State’s
failure to rebut his prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection, in violation of
the principles established in Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny”).
252
514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam).
253
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 & n.20 (1986) (emphasis added).
254
514 U.S. at 769 (per curiam). For this reason, Justice Stevens dissented, arguing
that the decision “overrule[d] a portion of our [Batson] opinion” by eliminating the requirement that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reason be related to the case to be tried. Id.
at 770, 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Elem v. Purkett, 64 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir.
1995) (highlighting, on remand from the Supreme Court, the inconsistency between its
decisions in Batson and Elem); Serr & Maney, supra note 236, at 14 (writing prior to the
Court’s decision in Elem and emphasizing that the prosecutor’s justification for a challenge
must be “related to the particular case”).
255
Elem, 514 U.S. at 769 (per curiam); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802–03 (1973) (concluding that an employer’s race-neutral rationale for an employment decision was sufficient to discharge its burden of proof “and to meet [the employee’s] prima facie case of discrimination”).
256
See, e.g., Aki-Khuam, 339 F.3d at 527 (reversing, under Elem, the trial court’s granting of Batson challenge on the basis that the proffered reasons were “‘terrible,’ unsupported in the record, based on a prospective juror’s response to a ‘trick question,’ or due
to defense counsel’s introduction of the word ‘slickster’”).
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persuasiveness of the justification [is] relevant” and that ultimately
“implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found
to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”257 This suggestion that
trial courts “probably will” reject nonpersuasive justifications during
the Batson inquiry is not borne out by our analysis, but it can be given
effect under our proposal.258
F. Meeting a Doctrinal Objection
Finally, we acknowledge a doctrinal objection to the proposal.
Our proposal would allow a constitutional remedy—the rejection of a
statutorily authorized peremptory challenge—even in situations
where there is insufficient proof to establish the existence of a constitutional violation. This is because Batson and its progeny establish
that an Equal Protection violation occurs only when an attorney engages in “purposeful” discrimination.259 If, as we propose, a trial
court can invalidate a peremptory challenge after finding an unrebutted appearance of discrimination, it could be contended that the proposal is insufficiently tethered to Batson and, thus, the constitutional
right that Batson enforces.260 To the extent this criticism is valid, it
can be answered by analogy to Miranda warnings and the decades of
practice that have shown that a robust enforcement of the Batson right
must of necessity sweep more broadly than the constitutional right
itself.
The analogy to Miranda is fairly straightforward. Under established legal doctrine, police questioning of a detained suspect without
“Miranda warnings” requires suppression of the suspect’s responses in
later trial proceedings.261 The suppression of this evidence is a constitutional remedy (it applies even in state court proceedings),262 and
yet it is applied in circumstances where there may not have been any
constitutional violation.263 Under the Fifth Amendment (or Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), police questioning is forbidden only if it compels involuntary responses, an occurrence that is
often not present simply because the police fail to provide proper Mi257

Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (per curiam) (emphasis added).
See supra Part III.
259
See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94.
260
Even if valid, however, this criticism would only eliminate the possibility that courts
could implement the proposal. It would still leave open the possibility of legislative action
in state or federal jurisdictions.
261
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
262
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) (ruling that Miranda is a constitutional decision because, “first and foremost,” the rule it announced has been applied
“to proceedings in state courts”).
263
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (noting that a violation of the Miranda rule may occur “even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation”).
258
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randa warnings (e.g., the unwarned suspect is an attorney or a police
officer).264
The Court has resolved this doctrinal puzzle by explaining that
“Miranda establishes a prophylactic rule that ‘sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself.’”265 Thus, “[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings” are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.”266
Miranda’s reasoning (as well as the language of the opinion) fits
neatly into the Batson context. Just as “in the individual case, Miranda’s preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant
who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm,”267 the remedy
proposed here would invalidate some strikes absent any Equal Protection violation. This overcorrection is necessary, however, as in Miranda, to remedy constitutional violations that would otherwise go
unremedied due to the virtual impossibility of discovery.268 The collateral damage of this broad sweep would be that the trial court will
disallow some peremptory strikes despite the absence of a constitutional violation. In comparison to the collateral damage of Miranda—
that a suspect’s voluntary confession to a crime may be excluded from
trial—the damage is quite minor.269
264
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (protecting the accused from being “compelled . . . to be
a witness against himself”); David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 294 (2000) (noting that it is
not the case that “every confession given without the warnings prescribed by Miranda is
involuntary”); David Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958,
961 (2001) (recognizing that “it is possible to imagine relatively realistic situations in which
custodial questioning without [Miranda] warnings would produce answers that we would
not characterize as ‘compelled’ in the ordinary sense of that term”).
265
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 362 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Elstad,
470 U.S. at 306 (“The Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself” and “may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation.”); cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (“‘[G]uided by considerations of justice,’ . . . and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within
limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.” (first alteration in original)); Strauss, supra note 264, at 963 (defending Miranda by
noting that “[m]any established principles of constitutional law have the same ‘prophylactic’ character as Miranda,” and providing examples).
266
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (alterations in original) (quoting
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
267
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307.
268
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (explaining that the Miranda court imposed a broadly sweeping protection for the right against compulsory selfincrimination because “reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a
risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession”).
269
See id. at 444 (“The disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may
be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his ‘rights,’ may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result.”).
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The methodological justifications for Miranda warnings also parallel justifications that apply in the Batson context. Just as Miranda
warnings are designed to eliminate egregious examples of police misconduct that while “undoubtedly the exception now, . . . are sufficiently widespread to be the object of concern,”270 Batson is designed
to eliminate the persistent use of race in jury selection that, while perhaps the exception, continues to plague jury selection.271 As in Miranda, “[u]nless a proper limitation upon [race-based peremptory
challenges] is achieved . . . there can be no assurance that practices of
this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.”272
CONCLUSION
In our adversary system, the arbitrary nature of peremptory challenges and the salience of race in modern society combine to create a
formidable obstacle to the eradication of race-based jury selection.
Yet the elimination of racial juror exclusion is necessary to defendants’ constitutional right to a jury of their peers, the Equal Protection
rights of the jurors themselves, and the integrity of the jury as a representative symbol of American society. When attorneys dismiss citizens
from juries based on race, or when citizens see their fellow citizens
dismissed from juries based on race, the criminal justice system suffers
a body blow regardless of the outcome of the trial to follow.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the primary guarantor
of race-neutrality in jury selection, the three-part test set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, is equal to the critically important task it has been
given. Our proposal seeks to alter this status quo by making trial court
findings of Batson violations more prevalent and less significant for the
parties involved. By removing any finding of attorney misconduct and
ensuring the availability of a simple remedy (juror reseating), our proposal should prove more palatable to those who vigorously object to
270

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
See supra Parts III, IV.
272
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435 (recognizing that modern police interrogation had
“blur[red] the line between voluntary and involuntary statements”); Miranda, 384 U.S. at
447; cf. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (asserting the powers of federal
courts to “formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the
Congress” in order to “implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights”; “preserve
judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly
before the jury”; and serve “as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct” (citations omitted)). We are not the first commentators to propose that broad remedies for Batson violations can be justified by analogy to Miranda. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 1694 (proposing
that aggressive judicial intervention to prevent race-based jury bias was justified by analogy
to “[t]he Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miranda that prophylactic measures were required
to counteract the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation”); cf. Ogletree, supra
note 192, at 1117–18 (advocating dismissal of prosecution as remedy for Batson violation
and analogizing to other judicial remedies for constitutional violations, such as exclusionary rule applied to violations of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments).
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more transformative reforms, such as abolishing peremptories, applying racial quotas in the jury box, or increasing sanctions for Batson
violations. It will also provide trial courts with a workable tool with
which to push back as zealous attorneys strategically attempt to shape
the racial composition of juries.
If, as we suggest, trial courts reseat stricken jurors whenever the
appearance of racial discrimination outweighs the proffered reason
for strikes without having to brand counsel a lying bigot, then Batson
can finally fulfill its promise to eradicate race-based jury selection. In
addition, little will be lost. The striking party loses only a small tactical
advantage, which is balanced by the removal of that same advantage
from the party’s adversary. Moreover, by focusing the inquiry on the
appearance of discrimination, our proposal minimizes the need for
trial court inquiry into potential jurors’ race and ethnicity as well as
into the animus of counsel. In sum, our proposal furthers what is arguably one of the most elusive goals of our jury system: “to impress
upon [every] criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a
verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with the law
by persons who are fair.”273
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